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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION:
THE JUDICIAL ATTITUDE*
Frances T. Freeman Jalett
The best law is a quiet agreement, made either by themselves,
betwixt whom the suit is, or by an umpire. If this do not proceed
(succeed) they come into court.1
Arbitration is one of the oldest modes of settling disputes. It is a
procedure derived in the main from the Roman law,2 but time has not
lessened its effectiveness. Its use is commonplace today and is increas-
ing.3 Nevertheless, there are those who decry the "extra-legal prac-
tices"4 of arbitration tribunals and find in arbitration proceedings
"the danger of the emergence of a new legal system" opposed to the
basic legal principles that have long governed communities.5 But such
a view, although it should not pass unnoticed, seems incompatible with
the fact that arbitration, like the adjudication of administrative
* While Mrs. Jalet is a member of the legal staff of the State of New York Law
Revision Commission, the views expressed herein are her own.
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 558, for biographical data.
1 Amos Comenius, Educator A.D. 1592-1670. Characterized as Comenius' plea for
voluntary arbitration before an umpire. 1 Arbitration in Action, Nos. 7-8, p. 1 (1943).
2 Judge John Bassett Moore states that the ancient origin of arbitration derives from
the Roman Law where there was developed a system of law without professionally
trained judges. This was substantially true of republican Rome where the trial of
specific issues was referred to persons (judices) chosen from a panel of laymen. 1
Moore, International Adjudications Historical and Legal Notes, pp. xxxvih-xxxix
(1929).
But Professor Nussbaum traces arbitration even further back, mentioning the possi-
bility that an arbitration clause was contained in the treaty concluded between two city
states of Mesopotamia (Lagash and Umma) in the fourth millenium B.C. (approxi-
mately 3100 B.C.) which, he says, "would make arbitration one of the most venerable
institutions of mankind...." Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations
2 (1954).
3 A relatively new development is the "The Nationwide Inter-Company Arbitration
Agreement" which has been signed by over 270 insurance companies. In discussing it,
Robert J. Demer says, "The Agreement provides, in essence, that the signatory com-
panies will forego the right to bring lawsuits against each other to collect property
damage claims which they pay as a result of automobile collisions. Instead of using
the courts of law to settle their disputes the companies have adopted a system of
arbitration." Demer, "270 Insurance Companies Arbitrate Inter-Company Claims," 64
Case and Com. 34, 35 (1959).
4 Kronstein, "Business Arbitration-Instrument of Private Government," 54 Yale
L.J. 36 (1944). In this article Dr. Kronstein, an authority on international trade, views
modern business arbitration as "incompatible with general concepts of positive law"
and even as attacking in principle the practical mandates of the Constitution of the
United States. He regards the inclusion of arbitration clauses in contracts as a device
for achieving by extra-legal means the application of "rules suited to the demands of
dominant commercial and industrial interests" which set up a new and separate law
governing national and international commercial transactions-one unhampered by
legal tradition or restrictions.
5 Herzog, "Judicial Review of Arbitration Proceedings-a Present Need," 5 DePaul
L. Rev. 14, 30-31 (1955).
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agencies, does not take place wholly on its own, but may at some
juncture be subject to judicial supervision.
THE CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL REvIEW
Judicial review is the power vested in the courts to pass upon the
actions or decisions of other governing bodies, whether they be a part
of the executive department, the legislature, an administrative
agency, or some lower court; this authority also is applied to indi-
viduals or a panel of persons known as arbitrators. "Judicial review"
is a term in common usage today,6 yet it is not defined in the leading
law dictionaries. 7 Perhaps it speaks for itself, but exposition would
prove helpful as it is not always given the same meaning by its users.
The title of a recent book, Judicial Review in the English Speaking
World," would seem to indicate a broad study of this topic's many
phases. Actually, it is limited to interpretations of the constitutions
and legislative enactments of various countries by their highest tri-
bunals. 9 It is in this realm of judicial control over legislative action,
however, that the concept of judicial review first gained foothold in
this country. Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madi-
son' ° marks this beginning." Its extension to include judicial super-
vision of decisions of administrative agencies came about naturally;
administrative bodies, although sometimes termed a "fourth branch"' 2
of the government, are in reality an extension of the legislative arm,
6 The Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011
(1958), entitles § 1009--"Judicial review of agency action."
7 Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) and Bouvier, Law Dictionary (Baldwin's ed.
1934), were consulted.
8 McWhinney, Judicial Review in the English Speaking World (1956).
9 Charles L. Black, Jr. gives this limited definition of judicial review in his recent
book: "By 'judicial review' I mean the practices followed by our courts of passing on
the constitutionality of laws and of other governmental action, where the issue of con-
stitutionality is properly raised in a judicial proceeding." Black, The People and the
Court, Judicial Review in a Democracy 2-3 (1960).
10 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Walter Gellhorn notes that this decision marks the
starting point of judicial review when he says, "Since 1803, however, judges in the
United States have been held to possess not only the power, but also the positive duty,
to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes and other governmental actions." Gell-
horn, American Rights-The Constitution in Action 2 (1960).
11 Justice Stanley F. Reed uttered words of praise when he said that the exercise
of judicial review "was an American contribution to the evolution of democracy" for
"few governments allow judicial review on the issue of the constitutionality either
of legislative or executive action." He added that judicial review might at times have
interfered with prompt action, but it assured deliberate judgment thus preserving
individual rights from despotic will. Reed, "Our Constitutional Philosophy," 21 Ky. St.
B.J. 136 (1957) (talk given at a state bar meeting).
In accord with this view, see Loewenstein, Political Power and the Governmental
Process 245 (1957): "Judicial review is by far the most conspicuous and distinctive
feature of the American pattern of government, . . .".
12 Gellhorn and Byse, Administrative Law Cases and Comments ix (1954).
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for they function under authority delegated to them by the legisla-
ture.: 3
Judicial review of arbitration, however, is a less natural phenomenon
and one that has given rise to charges of judicial interference and hos-
tility, on the one hand, and to countercharges of lawlessness and at-
tempts to side-step judicial strictures, on the other. The question to
be pursued in this study is the underlying basis for these charges.
This basis for dissatisfaction can, perhaps, best be discovered by first
examining the nature of arbitration, and then seeking to determine the
extent to which the umpire designated by the contestants to render a
decision is permitted to do so, and the degree to which the arbitration
process is allowed to operate in its own way, free from judicial inter-
position.
THE NATURE OF ARBITRATION AND ITS RELATION TO JUDIcIAL REvIEW
Arbitration has been defined as "a simple proceeding voluntarily
chosen by parties who want a dispute determined by an impartial
judge of their own mutual selection, whose decision, based on the
merits of the case, they agree in advance to accept as final and bind-
ing."' 4 It is an extra-judicial proceeding in which the arbiter may be
a lay person.
The very nature of arbitration tends to limit the extent to which its
proceedings and its concluding award should be subject to review by
the courts. It is conducted informally by persons not necessarily
trained in the law. 5 The evidence heard need meet none of the techni-
cal evidentiary requirements imposed by courts of law.' Seldom is
13 Id. at 65. "[AIR administrative authority is conferred (directly or by implication)
by a statute." See generally chapter H, "Legislative and Executive Control of Adminis-
trative Action."
14 Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 2 (1952). Compare this definition of the arbitra-
tion process: "The process of arbitration involves (i) an identifiable dispute or con-
troversy between parties (ii) which by agreement of such parties (iii) is referred or
referable to one or more persons for final decision." Carlston, "Theory of the Arbitra-
tion Process," 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 631 (1952).
15 Persons chosen as arbitrators are often experts in their field and courts are reluctant
to disturb their determinations. In Arlington Towers Land Corp. v. John McShain, Inc.,
150 F. Supp. 904 (D.D.C. 1957), the court found that the arbitrator was to place his
own fair and reasonable value upon certain work to be performed and the mere fact
the court's viewpoint of valuation differed was not a basis for setting aside the award.
This case is discussed infra at text accompanying note 85.
I' Compania Panemena Maritima v. 3. E. Hurley Lumber Co., 244 F.2d 286
(2d Cir. 1957). In an action to enjoin arbitrators from proceeding further it was held
that there could be no application to the district court to review rulings of arbitrators
on admissibility of evidence regarding fraud while the arbitration was in process. The
party must wait and attack the award when made. Accord: Commercial Solvents Corp.
v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Respondent sought
to make use of the federal discovery rules by serving notice on the other party as to
the taking of depositions. He was denied this privilege, for "respondent chose to avail
itself of procedures peculiar to the arbitral process rather than those used in judicial
1960]
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there raised even a question of due process as is so common in the
review of administrative actions, 17 since it is not the state that is decid-
ing the issue, but individuals selected by the parties as a result of
mutual agreement. Still another important factor affecting judicial
review is the ordinary absence of a written opinion' s by the arbitrator
(labor cases have become an exception to this rule)' 9 upon which judg-
ment can be passed. There is no record before the court unless the
parties have chosen to go to that expense.20 It can readily be seen why
arbitration is advocated as saving time and money. Controversies can
be brought to a much speedier conclusion than is possible when court
procedures must be pursued. Furthermore, arbitration normally may
proceed as soon as the parties are ready and have selected their um-
pire,2 1 rather than waiting its turn on crowded dockets as do ordinary
determinations." 20 F.R.D. at 361. The opinion outlines with clarity the differences
between arbitral and court procedures.
But consider the warning word of Soia Mentschikoff in "The Significance of Arbitra-
tion," 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 698, 704 (1952):
[T]o the extent that rules of procedure or evidence are adapted to the rational
process of disputation, they are as much a part of the arbitration process as they
are a part of the legal process. The difference lies in their mechanics of application
and in the nature of the deflecting factors. The basic question is not whether rules
of procedure or evidence are used in arbitration, for they dearly must be; the
question is whether the ones used in arbitration are geared to the production of a
better, in the sense of a more just, result, than those used in the court process.
Another writer notes that although the law provides no standard which would give
uniformity or regularity to arbitration proceedings, in actual practice "most arbitrators
feel that they must conform to some objective standards in procedural matters, vague
and indefinite as those standards necessarily are." Gorske, "Burden of Proof in Griev-
ance Arbitration," 43 Marq. L. Rev. 135, 179 (1959).
17 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920) (due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment considered violated).
18 "The real reason why in the American system, awards with opinions are un-
known and not used at all is the fact that we do not want the courts to go into the
matter of awards." Remarks of Dr. Martin Domke. Quoted from Proceedings of the
International Trade Arbitration Conference, March 23, 1955.
It is noteworthy that the N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1460 makes provision that the award
"must be in writing," but says nothing about an opinion. The same is true in the Uni-
form Arbitration Act § 8.
19 In addition to the award, it is customary in labor cases for the arbitrator to
prepare a written opinion explaining his decision. This is an important characteristic
of a labor arbitration case as it is seldom the practice of arbitrators in other types
of cases to do more than make an award, without rendering an opinion. An
arbitrator's opinion in a labor case, however, is of such significance that without
it, much of the usefulness of the arbitration process would be lost. This is because.
a decision in a labor case too often requires more than a mere judgment on the
rights or wrongs of the parties' past conduct.
Platt, "The Arbitration Process in the Settlement of Labor Disputes," 31 J. Am. Jud.
Soc'y 54, 56-57 (1947).
20 Elkouri, note 14 supra at 11.
21 An illustration is found in patent cases, where one writer found through ex-
perience that
the disposition of the arbitrated causes was expeditiously effected with a tre-
mendous saving from the time-consuming and expense standpoints, and ended
litigation in a period of twenty days of direct trial work, which litigation might
have continued over five to ten years, if the cases had been presented individually in
the United States courts.
Robb, "Arbitration Procedure Compared with Court Litigation in Patent Contro-
versies," 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 679, 689 (1952).
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litigated cases.22
Arbitration has been strengthened in the past few decades by the
enactment of arbitration statutes, both state2 3 and federal,A which
by creating a uniform routine to be followed, and by making specific
provision for the enforceability of arbitration contracts (not all enact-
ments afford broad protection to every kind of agreement), have
added an element of certainty and predictabilitys that was previously
22 The Pennsylvania Arbitration Act [Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §§ 1-181 (Supp. 1958)]
is said to have relieved congested court calendars. It is said that this new method of settl-
ing disputes was found to strike a blow at the "trenchant criticism of the law's delay"
and to demonstrate "that the organs of society are still capable of fashioning needed tools
for government." Westwood, "The Law's Delay and the Pennsylvania Arbitration Plan,"
39 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 50, 53 (1955). To the same effect, see LaBrum, "Congested
Trial Calendars," 43 A.B.AJ. 311 (1957).
23 New York State led the way with the enactment in 1920 of the first arbitration
law, which has served as a model for other statutes. Its coverage is comprehensive
and includes, by special mention, contracts of employment in the labor field. N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1448-1469 (Supp. 1959).
24 The United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883 (1925), codified 61 Stat. 669
(1947), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958), "makes 'valid, irrevocable, and enforceable' only two
types of contracts; those relating to maritime transactions and those involving com-
merce." Douglas, J., in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198,
200 (1956). Section 1 of the act defines "maritime transactions" and "commerce" and
concludes with this qualification: "but nothing herein contained shall apply to con-
tracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." There is irreconcilable conflict in the
federal circuits as to whether collective bargaining agreements are included with the
term "contracts of employment" in section 1. The Supreme Court has not authorita-
tively construed this exclusionary clause. The division of opinion is reflected in
Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Union, 217 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1954), holding
that a collective bargaining agreement is a trade agreement rather than a contract
of employment and therefore does not fall within the exclusionary provisions of the
Act, but for another reason (because the bargaining agreement did not provide for
arbitration of the particular controversy involved) the federal act could not be applied;
Tenney Eng'r, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953), holding that
collective bargaining agreements are contracts of employment within the purview of the
United States Arbitration Act, but that the excepting language does not apply when the
workers- are engaged not in commerce but in the production of goods for interstate com-
merce; International Union v. Colonial Hardwood Floor Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir.
1948), holding that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract of employment and
as such is excluded from the operation of the Act. The existing conflict has made it
doubtful whether arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements are enforceable
under the Federal Arbitration Act. This has led management and labor to seek a resolu-
tion of their difficulties under the hoped for aegis of § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Law, 61
Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958)-and with a measure of success. See Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), discussed infra at text accompany-
ing note 120.
The same confusion does not prevail in the state courts. Although the statutes
of some states specifically exclude collective bargaining agreements (see, for example,
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1509(B), the laws of other states specifically require their
inclusion. This is true in New York N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1448. There are states
also which have special statutes devoted exclusively to the problems of labor relations.
The law of Oklahoma sets up a State Board of Arbitration and Conciliation to handle
labor disputes. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, §§ 4-10 (1954); see Note, 45 Cornell L.Q.
580, especially 584-85 n.36 (1960).
25 Note, "Predictability of Result in Commercial Arbitration," 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1022
(1948). This article seeks to dispel the fear that because most arbitrators are laymen,
substantive rules of law are ignored. An analysis of the cases reveals, it is said,
that the basis of decision is rational and predictable. But see also Marks, "Shaky
Foundation of Arbitration," 13 Bar. Bull. N.Y. County Law. Ass'n 206, 208 (1956),
1960]
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lacking in this branch of the law.26 There still remain, however, many
jurisdictions27 in which the common law rule prevails that agreements
to arbitrate, though perfectly legal, are revocable at the option of
either party up to the time of the granting of the award, 8 and there-
fore will not be enforced in the courts of those states. This doctrine
has been particularly harsh on agreements to arbitrate future disputes.
Certainly it cannot be denied that the refusal of courts to enforce
an agreement they characterize as valid has caused confusion and
disappointment to those who consent to arbitrate their differences.
For two persons to solemnly agree to pursue a course of action which
is deemed completely legal, and then to find that there is no sanction
behind their agreement other than the good faith of either party, raises
strong doubts as to the wisdom of judicial adherence to the common
law rule.29  But it has a respectable lineage and a long history com-
mencing in 1609 with an early ruling on the revocability of the author-
ity given an arbitrator in Vynior's Case." This was a mere dictum
by Lord Coke, although in some inexplicable fashion 3' it led, in
Kill v. Hollister,32 to the pronouncement of the theory, since oft re-
peated, that the courts cannot approve irrevocability because it
"ousts the jurisdiction of the courts." Thus were sown the seeds of
a growing judicial antipathy to arbitration which reached full flower
decrying the "lack of predictability" in arbitration, the outcome being a "matter
of pure speculation."
26 For just as with the mushrooming of administrative agencies administrative law
became a separately recognized field of study in our leading law schools, so also courses
in the law of arbitration are now offered, though not as widely as in the case of
administrative law. Here, too, there is a burgeoning, for it has been estimated that
"the matters going to arbitration rather than to the courts represent 70 percent or
more of our total civil litigation." Mentschikoff, supra note 16 at 698. See "An
Outline of a Course in Arbitration Law," planned by J. Noble Braden and Martin
Domke, and presented in 11 Arb. J. (n.s.) 115 (1956).
27 The common law rule applies except in those states which have adopted statutes
which change it. A fairly uniform modern arbitration law has been adopted in some
18 states, three of this number-Florida, Minnesota and Wyoming-adopted the Uniform
Arbitration Act approved by the National Conference of the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Law, August 20, 1955, as amended August 24, 1956. Florida and Minnesota
enacted it in 1957 (Florida with slight modifications); Wyoming in 1959. The dates
for the 15 other state enactments are: New York (1920), New Jersey (1923), Massa-
chusetts (1925), Oregon (1925), California (1927), Louisiana (1928), Pennsylvania
(1928), Arizona (1929), Connecticut (1929), New Hampshire (1929), Rhode Island
(1929), Ohio (1931), Wisconsin (1931), Michigan (1941), Washington (1943). Most
statutes plainly preserve the common law right of arbitration which the parties are
sometimes anxious to resort to when there may not have been strict compliance with
the statute. See Zelle v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 242 Minn. 439, 65 N.W.2d 583 (1954).
28 Rison v. Moon, 91 Va. 384 (1895).
29 See discussion of common law rules in Sayre, "Development of Commercial
Arbitration Law," 37 Yale L.J. 595, 598 (1928), and Lorenzen, "Commercial Arbitration
-International and Interstate Aspects," 43 Yale L.J. 716, 718-19 (1934).
30 8 Co. 80a, 81b, 77 Eng. Rep. 595, 597 (K.B. 1609).
31 Analyzing the evolution of the doctrine of revocability, see Sayre, "Development
of Commercial Arbitration Law," 37 Yale L.J. 595, 598-604 (1928).
32 1 Wils. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746).
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and has continued on down to the present day,3 although it has sub-
stantially lessened.-'
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Despite all the advantages of arbitration and the stronger position
it holds today, it faces hazards that may, as one author has recently
put it, "reverse the trend towards arbitration as a means of settle-
ment," at least in labor disputes.3 5 Chief among these is the scope of
judicial review, 6 which is one of the bases for the above-quoted as-
sertion.
There have been few charges against the judiciary in arbitration
cases, as there have been in the past with respect to its review of de-
cisions of administrative agencies,3 7 that the courts were abdicating
their function and deferring to arbitrators. Instead, criticism is
sharply the other way. Reference is to "judicial intervention," ' to
"the hostility of the courts,"3 9 to "unwarranted interference,1 40 and
33 See dissenting opinion of judge Brown in Refinery Employees Union v. Con-
tinental Oil Co., 268 F.2d 447, 460 (5th Cir. 1959), discussed infra at text accompany-
ing note 135, where he relentlessly criticizes the majority opinion for its refusal to find
that the arbitrator had power to award damages as a remedy.
34 In Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc, 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. granted, 28 U.S.L. Week 3259 (U.S. March 7, 1960) (No. 659), judge
Medina displayed a judicial attitude very favorable toward arbitration. The case is
discussed infra at text accompanying note 104. See also 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 915 (1960).
35 Feinsinger, "Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A New Era in Collective Bargain-
ing," 43 Va. L. Rev. 1261, 1275 (1957), discussing the opinion of Mr. justice Douglas in
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
36 The provisions for "Appeals" contained in the New York Arbitration Law (N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Act § 1467) and Uniform Arbitration Act § 19 are not directly encompassed
in this study of judicial review, for they offer the usual court protection and proceed
as appeals normally do in a civil action. The United States Arbitration Act (9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958)) has no provision for appeals as such, §§ 3 and 4 referring
only to motions to stay or compel arbitration. These provisions are found also in the
New York Arbitration Law § 1450 (Supp. 1959) (to compel) and § 1451 (Supp. 1959)(to stay) and the Uniform Act § 2. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure appear
to make a special appeals provision unnecessary. See 28 U.S.C. where "Rules of
Courts" are set forth following § 2042, especially Rule 81a(3) ("Application of Rules
to Arbitration Proceedings").
37 justice Frankfurter writing the opinion in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 489-90 (1951). And note Professor Cox's comment:
The parallel problem which arose in defining the scope of judicial review of ad-
ministrative action was resolved against judicial abdication and in favor of permit-
ting the judge to ask whether, on the record of administrative action, he could con-
scientiously enforce the dictate of the administrative agency. Although we may
hope that the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards will never be as broad
as review of administrative action, it is important to realize the degree to whichjudges feel that they are required to stultify themselves if their sole function is to
rubber-stamp arbitrary decisions by another, unofficial tribunal.
Cox, "Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 591, 605 (1954).
38 Syme, "Arbitrability of Labor Disputes," 5 Rutgers L. Rev. 455, 464 (1951).
39 Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir.
1942) (opinion by Frank, J.); and, more recently, Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 407, 412 (2d Cir. 1959) (opinion by Medina, J.).
40 Note, 6 Syracuse L. Rev. 357 (1955).
1960]
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to "the growing mistrust and apprehension with which judges have
viewed arbitration proceedings.1 4
1
Is this castigation of the measure of control exercised by the ju-
diciary justified? Do not the origins of arbitration in contract law42
mean that this mode of settlement falls naturally under the province
of judges skilled in determining the existence of all manner of agree-
ments and in interpreting their terms? And can it not be argued that
our courts are doing no more than is required of them-fulfilling their
proper function as guardians of the legal rights and duties of those
who appear before them-serving ultimately as the final arbiters of
any dispute? An answer to these queries may lie in an examination
of the actual scope of judicial review.
The Charge of Judicial Hostility--Case Illustrations
The doctrine of judicial jealousy, if in fact it ever had existence43
except in the constant repetition of a vacuous phrase,44 met with a
strong rebuff in the 1950's when lawyers and scholars alike rose in
protest and a plethora of articles appeared in law reviews45 and other
legal publications.46 Both commercial and labor arbitrations were
defended. The general tenor of these writings was that the courts
were encroaching upon the prerogatives of the arbitrator. The accu-
sations ran thus:
41 Herzog, "Judicial Review of Arbitration Proceedings-A Present Need," 5 De Paul
L. Rev. 14, 17 (1955).
42 Williston discusses the "primary contractual phases" of arbitration, in his treatise,
6 Williston, Contracts § 1918 (rev. ed. 1938).
The law of arbitration seems to have begun as a part of the law of contracts. In
the earlier cases familiar contract principles were expounded (and are today)-was
there adequate consideration for the mutual promises to arbitrate? Had there been
a meeting of the minds? Was there a basis for rescission resulting from undue in-
fluence, fraud or mistake? To resolve these doubts recourse to the courts was cus-
tomarily had with respect to agreements to arbitrate just as with other contracts.
Today, however, arbitration seems to have outgrown the limits of contract law as
there has developed a distinct body of principles known as "arbitration law." Leading
treatises in the field are Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards (1930) and
Russell, Law of Arbitration (16th ed. 1957).
43 Sayre questions the propriety of attributing "such unworthy motives to the courts
in their development of arbitration law from the earliest times to the present," Sayre,
"Development of Commercial Arbitration Law," 37 Yale L.J. 595, 610 (1928).
44 The offending phrase is "oust the jurisdiction of the courts."
45 Cox, "Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 591
(1954); Herzog, "Judicial Review of Arbitration Proceedings-A Present Need," 5
DePaul L. Rev. 14 (1955); Sturges and Murphy, "Some Confusing Matters Relating
to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act," 17 Law & Contemp. Prob.
580 (1952); Summers, "Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the
Looking Glass," 2 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1952); Syme, "Arbitrability of Labor Disputes,"
5 Rutgers L. Rev. 455 (1951) ; Comments, "Judicial Control of Arbitrators' jurisdiction
in New York," 38 Cornell L.Q. 391 (1953); "Judicial Innovations in the New York
Arbitration Law," 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 148 (1953); Note, "Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards on the Merits," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 681 (1950).
46 Mayer, "Judicial 'Bulls' in the Delicate China Shop of Labor Arbitration," 2 Lab.
L.J. 502 (1951).
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1. The courts have substituted their judgment for that of the arbitrator.
In Black v. Cutter Laboratories,47 a proceeding by a union against
the employer to enforce an arbitral award, the arbitrator's decision
rested upon a finding that the employee, Mrs. Doris Walker, had been
discharged because of union activities rather than upon the ground
proffered by the company that she was an alleged Communist. Her
reinstatement with back pay was ordered. The affirmance of this
award by the lower court in San Francisco was reversed (three judges
dissenting), the Supreme Court of California taking the position that
it was against the public policy of the state to grant enforcement
where, as here, the party to be reinstated was an avowed Communist
advocating the overthrow of our government. Yet the arbitrator was
aware of Mrs. Walker's membership and considered it in making his
award, as well as the added circumstance that the employer had
known of the affiliation for some two years prior to the discharge,
which fact, the arbitrator concluded, made the basis for the discharge
"stale." The California court denied rehearing, but the case went to
the Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari upon constitu-
tional issues not directly relevant here.4 8
It is worthy of note, however, that the Supreme Court's dismissal
of the writ because "there was no substantial federal question pre-
sented" was disapproved by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Doug-
las and Black. The majority had found that there was no more in-
volved than "California's construction of a local contract under local
law"-that the state court's construction of the term "just cause" to
embrace membership in the Communist Party was a determination it
was free to make and afforded a justifiable ground for Mrs. Walker's
discharge. Justice Douglas in a strong dissent noted that not bnly did
the decision of the California Supreme Court substitute that court's
finding as to the ground of discharge for the one given by the arbitra-
tion board (membership in the Communist Party rather than union
47 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d 905 (1955).
48 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, 351 U.S. 292, 299
(1956), the writ was dismissed. The opinion of the California court was carefully
studied, and although Justice Clark recognized that there was some support for the
charge made by counsel for Mrs. Walker that the state court spoke in terms of a Cali-
fornia public policy against specific performance of arbitration awards that in effect
protected activities "by a Communist on behalf of her party whether in the guise of
unionism or otherwise" and that a decision resting upon such grounds might violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, nevertheless a determination of the
constitutional question could be bypassed for there was sufficient other ground upon
which the Supreme Court of California could have rested its opinion. justice Clark noted
that the Supreme Court of California "did not limit itself to a discussion of the applica-
tion of California public policy," but "subjected the findings of the Arbitration Board
to scrutinizing review."
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activity), but that a state decision resting on such grounds raised "an
important question under the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
The Justice found that Mrs. Walker was penalized for her beliefs in
violation of the Bill of Rights.4"
It becomes clear that the decision in this case is taken out of the
normal arbitration setting by the taint of "communist activity" which
attaches to the facts. One can detect a natural judicial unwillingness
to force a company-especially one engaged in a business affecting
public health and safety, the production of antibiotics for the civilian
and military population-to reinstate an employee of questionable
loyalty.
2. Under the guise of a need to construe the contract, the courts in-
terpret its terms when it is the function of the arbitrator to do so.
In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc.,50
a collective bargaining agreement provided that the union and the
company would meet at a designated time "to discuss payment" of
a bonus in the ensuing year. Union and management took opposing
views of the meaning of the provision "to discuss payment," the union
interpreting it to mean that a bonus would definitely be paid and only
the amount thereof remained to be determined, the company claiming
that its obligation was fulfilled when it met "to discuss" the matter.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed (two judges dissenting) the
per curiam opinion of the appellate division which denied the union's
motion to compel arbitration. The court affirmed the lower court's
opinion that "the clause of the agreement ...can only mean what it
says, that the parties will discuss the subject."51 The First Department
upheld the power of the courts to determine in the first instance whether
there exists an arbitrable issue-whether there was an agreement to
arbitrate the particular type of dispute in question-but found there
was no issue here:
[T]he mere assertion by a party of a meaning of a provision which is
clearly contrary to the plain meaning of the words cannot make an
arbitrable issue. It is for the Court to determine whether the contract
contains a provision for arbitration of the dispute tendered. . . .If
49 "Communists, except and unless they violate laws, are entitled to the same civil
rights as other citizens." 351 U.S. 292, 303 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"I do not think we can hold consistently with our Bill of Rights that Communists
can be proscribed from making a living on the assumption that wherever they work
the incidence of sabotage rises or that the danger from Communist employees is too
great for critical industry. to bear." Id. at 304.
50 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (ist Dep't) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 297 N.Y.
519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947), discussed in Kharas and Koretz, "Judicial Determination
of the Arbitrable Issue," 11 Arb. J. (n.s.) 135, 140 (1956).
51 271 App. Div. 917, 918, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317, 318 (1st Dep't 1947).
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the meaning of the provision of the contract sought to be arbitrated
is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to arbitrate and the con-
tract cannot be said to provide for arbitration. (Emphasis added.) 52
The New York Court of Appeals adopted this reasoning as its own
in Matter of General Elec. Co.5 3 saying, "If there is no real ground
of claim, the tourt may refuse to allow arbitration, although the al-
leged dispute may fall within the literal language of the arbitration
agreement.""'
The case of Alpert v. Admiration Knitwear Co.55 cites with ap-
proval the Cutler-Hammer and General Electric decisions. In this
case the purchaser sought specific enforcement of the provision
for arbitration contained in a contract for the sale of woolen materials.
That contract gave the seller the right to demand cash payments in
advance where the purchaser's financial responsibility became unsatis-
factory. The seller invoked this provision and notified the purchaser
that henceforth no goods would be shipped except upon payment in
advance. The purchaser refused to comply with this demand and
called for arbitration of this dispute. The court found that the seller
was not guilty of any breach of contract for failure to deliver and
therefore it could not be compelled to proceed to arbitration. Further-
more, the controversy over payments could raise no arbitrable issue
because the failure to tender payment upon demand terminated the
contract; thus, there was no longer an issue thereunder to submit to
arbitration.
3. The courts have narrowed the jurisdiction of the arbitrator by
requiring the clearest and broadest language in order to find that he
has any.
Matter of Western Union Tel. Co. 6 was a case that seemed to call
rather strongly for a decision in favor of arbitration and which arose
upon an application by the union for confirmation of the arbitrator's
award. The collective bargaining agreement between the union and the
52 Ibid.
53 300 N.Y. 262, 264, 90 N.E.2d 181, 182 (1949) (per curiam). The union sought
to compel arbitration of a dispute over pension credits.
54 Id. at 264. In Towns & James, Inc. v. Barasch, 197 Misc. 1022, 96 N.Y.S.2d 32
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950) a lower court reached the same result by finding the lan-
guage of the agreement "not explicit enough" to cover a wage revision controversy be-
tween union and employer. It is noteworthy that in both the General Electric and Towns
& James case there was before the court a situation where the arbitrator would be making
a new agreement for the parties. The arbitration of contract negotiation disputes
concerned with the terms of new or renewal contracts is viewed with much less
enthusiasm by the disputants themselves as well as by the courts, for they are not deemed
suitable for arbitration. See Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 16 (1952).
0 304 N.Y. 1, 105 N.E.2d 561 (1952).
56 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 (1949), discussed in Note, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 347
(1949) and criticized as "seriously impairing the usefulness of arbitration proceedings."
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company contained a "no strike or other stoppages of work" clause.
Sympathy for a strike called by affiliated unions against certain cable
companies caused the union members to refuse to handle messages for
any of the strike-bound companies. The issue as to whether this con-
stituted a breach of contract was submitted to an arbitrator authorized
to interpret, but not to alter the contract. The arbitrator took cog-
nizance of a custom in the industry "not to handle struck traffic" and,
finding that there was no breach, decided the controversy in favor of
the union. On appeal, the appellate division's reversal of the supreme
court's order confirming the award was affirmed, on the ground that
the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he took into account extrinsic
circumstances in order to interpret the contract, the court viewing what
he did as amounting to an alteration of it. The decision would seem to
impose the court's interpretation of the "clear language" of the con-
tract upon the parties thereto, rather than the meaning accorded it by
their chosen umpire.
This review presents only some of the usurpations charged against
the judiciary. The accusations appear too sweeping,5 7 but their ulti-
mate effect has been to impugn the motives of the courts and to weaken
the cause of arbitration.
One is led to question why judicial hostility to arbitration has con-
tinued to linger in our courts.58 The force of precedent alone cannot
account for it.59 One answer may be found in the similarity between
the functions of the arbitrator and the judge. Arbitration has been
characterized as essentially a "judicial process" 6°---both judges and
57 The decisions in the cases discussed in the immediately preceding pages, which
have been cited as most flagrantly displaying hostility, can be justified if it is con-
sidered that other factors entered into the decisions of the courts. In Black v. Cutter
Laboratories, supra note 47, a taint of Communist activity pervaded the facts sur-
rounding the employee's discharge. In Matter of General Elec. Co., supra note 53, it
is questionable whether the particular facts of the case could have warranted any other
result. The union sought to invoke an anti-discrimination clause, which was a part of
one collective bargaining agreement, in a second, separate and distinct agreement having
no relation to the first. This the court would not permit. Lastly, in the most challenged
case of all, Matter of Western Union Tel. Co., supra note 56, the action of the
company's employees in refusing to transmit messages violated the Penal Law and was
considered unlawful conduct. The fact that the company was "the only landline
telegraph carrier operating in the United States" was also a factor, for it was then
affected with a public interest.
58 Judge Frank carefully traces the history of the judicial attitude toward arbitra-
tion in Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2d
Cir. 1942). At one point he says: "The hostility of the English Courts to executory
arbitrations ...was largely taken over in the 19th Century by most courts in this
country." He finds that the lower federal courts became critical of this judicial un-
friendliness and the Supreme Court began to waver. The passage of the United States
Arbitration Act of 1925 served "to alter the judicial atmosphere previously existing."
59 See reference to early English cases, supra, p. 524.
60 Carlston, "Theory of the Arbitration Process," 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 631
(1952). Note that in international law, arbitrations between nations are regarded
"as essentially a judicial process." 1 Moore, International Adjudications xl-lxii (1929),
where the learned author reviews authorities throughout the world.
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arbitrators are arbiters of disputes. Each operates in a separate and
distinct area. There is no merging. Nevertheless, because the final
control lies in the courts they have naturally tended to overstep their
bounds, especially where they regard themselves as equally, or per-
haps even better, qualified to settle the controversy. Certainly with
respect to language limiting matters that are arbitrable,61 courts are
justified in carrying out their customary function as they give effect
to the intention of the parties.2 The application of this doctrine
of intent is two-sided. It may lead to the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate as well as to their invalidation, depending upon the facts.
Where the contest has proceeded to arbitration and a question is
raised only after the rendering of the award, not only will the party
objecting be deemed to have waived his right to do so, but the courts
view his protest with a skeptical eye.63 Mere dissatisfaction with the
outcome of an award is not a ground for objection-an adverse de-
cision is one of the risks of arbitration."
In trying to understand the attitude of the judiciary, it must be
remembered that arbitrators function under the power bestowed upon
them by the parties-that its source is the arbitration agreement,
which is a "charter"65 of their authority to act thereunder. It is,
therefore, incumbent upon the courts to determine the extent of that
authority,66 especially when it has been, challenged by one of the
61 Matter of Belding Heminway Co., 295 N.Y. 541, 68 N.E.2d 681 (1946). It
was a debatable question whether the dosed shop provisions were intended to be
applied to employees in the New Jersey plant. Arbitration stayed. Cf. Matter of
Bohlinger 305 N.Y. 539, 114 N.E.2d 31 (1953) where the question was whether the
right to discharge was an arbitrable issue under the broad language of the collective
agreement. It was held that it was and that the employer's motion to stay arbitration
must be denied. And see the Cutler-Hammer case discussed in the text accompanying
note 50.
62 Matter of Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494, 496, 62 N.E. 575, 576 (1902) (arbitration award
affirmed).
63 Dressier v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 102 Ohio App. 503, 144 N.E.2d 269 (1957).
A government contract relating to an air conditioning system was to be construed.
The party was held estopped to raise the question of legality and enforceability of the
contract clause providing for arbitration where he had proceeded to arbitrate and made
no complaint until the award went against him.
64 Canadian Gulf Lines, Ltd. v. Continental Grain Co., 98 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1938)
(petition by charterer to compel arbitration in accordance with terms of charter party
granted). judge Augustus Hand quite appropriately said: "Arbitration sometimes
involves perils that even surpass the 'perils of the seas.'" Id. at 714. And see Matter of
Wilkins, supra note 62.
65 Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards 144 (1930). The issue of the
arbitrator's authority is often inextricably interwoven with the determination of the
arbitrable issue-whether it was agreed to arbitrate the particular type of dispute. If
it was not, the arbitrator has no authority to render a decision concerning it. See En-
gieers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., discussed infra, text accompanying note 132.
6 The situation is analogous with respect to the acts of administrative agencies:
"Even where judicial review is proscribed by statute, the courts have the power and the
duty to make certain that the administrative official has not acted in excess of the
grant of authority given him by statute or in disregard of the standard prescribed by
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parties, the very giver of the power. And, of course, in the absence of
any express direction to that effect, it is not for the arbitrator to de-
termine the limits of his own jurisdiction.6 7 There can be no quarrel,
therefore, with this aspect of judicial review. There may be instances
where uncertainties of language have led to doubts that have been
resolved against the arbitrator, 8 but that is a part of the decisional
process.
Interpretation is likewise an inherent court function. Judges know,
from long experience in construing contracts and enforcing contractual
obligations, that the parties do not always mean what they say-that
a term may creep into an agreement without one side or the other
ever having been aware of it.6 9 Arbitration clauses should, therefore,
be drafted with care. They are subject to close judicial scrutiny.
Where the parties foresee the possibility of future disputes and wish
to choose arbitration as the means by which their differences are to
be settled, preferring it to the more contentious nature of litigation,
the choice is theirs, but it must be clearly made. All too often it is
not."o
Status of Arbitration Award
There is one aspect of arbitration-the status of arbitral awards-
to which the courts practically "pledge allegiance," yet which they
have had great difficulty in following. An arbitration award stands on
a different footing from either a lower court decision or an adjudica-
tion of an administrative agency.7 1 Awards are not reviewable on
the legislature." Matter of Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Bohlinger, 308 N.Y. 174, 183, 124
N.E.2d 110, 114 (1954).
67 Sturges, op. cit. supra note 65 at 145, adding that the courts do not readily
infer that the agreement accords such power.
68 Chandley Bros. & Co. v. Cambridge Springs, 200 Pa. 230, 233, 49 AtI. 772, 773
(1901), where the court says: "Whatever powers the engineer had to settle disputes
between the contracting parties are found in paragraph twenty-four of the general
specifications and conditions of agreement, and nowhere else." The engineer who was
designated by the parties to make decisions as to the true meaning of drawings or
specifications or the character of work was held not to be empowered to pass upon
an issue of liquidated damages in cases of delay.
69 Matter of Tanenbaum Textile Co. v. Schlanger, 287 N.Y. 400, 40 N.E.2d 225
(1942). An arbitration provision stamped on an invoice in red ink was held in-
effective as an agreement to arbitrate. Accord: Matter of Albrecht Chemical Co., 298
N.Y. 437, 84 N.E.2d 625 (1949) (Purchase orders sent by buyer provided for arbitration).
70 Riverdale Fabrics Corp. v. Tiflinghast-Stiles Co., 306 N.Y. 288, 291, 118 N.E.2d
104, 106 (1954), where the arbitration clause was contained not in the contract, but in
a separate document, the "Cotton Yarn Rules of 1938" to which the contract was
subject, but there was no incorporation by reference. The court in denying arbitration
said: "The intent must be dear to render arbitration the exclusive remedy; parties are
not to be led into arbitration unwittingly through subtlety." The problem seems par-
ticularly acute in labor arbitrations. See discussion of § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947.
71 Review of decisions of lower courts, made on appeal, may present questions of
law or fact. Administrative agency adjudications are conclusive as to findings of fact
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questions of law nor on questions of fact-nor of mixed law and fact.
This plenary power of the arbitrator is asserted again and again by the
courts: "Where the merits of the controversy are referred to an arbi-
trator selected by the parties, his determination, either as to the law or
the facts, is final and conclusive." 2 This is true both at common law
and according to statute.7 3 The statement of the Court of Appeals of
New York, made through Andrews, J., has become a classic on this sub-
ject:
It is the general doctrine pervading our jurisprudence on the sub-ject, that the decision of an arbitrator in a matter within his jurisdic-
tion is final and conclusive between the parties. The- jealousy with
which, at one time, courts regarded agreement of parties, has yielded to
a more sensible view, and arbitrations are now encouraged as an easy,
expeditious and inexpensive method of settling disputes, and as tending
to prevent litigation. The arbitrator is a judge appointed by the parties;
he is by their consent invested with judicial functions in the particular
case; he is to determine the right as between the parties in respect to
the matter submitted, and all questions of fact or law upon which the
right depends are, under a general submission, deemed to be referred
to him for decision. The court possesses no general supervisory power
over awards, and if arbitrators keep within their jurisdiction their
award will not be set aside because they have erred in judgment either
upon the facts or the law. If courts should assume to judge the decision
of arbitrators upon the merits, the value of this method of settling
controversies would be destroyed, and an award instead of being a final
determination of a controversy would become but one of the steps in
its progress.74
But though the courts have done yeoman duty in giving lip service
to this doctrine, in actual practice they have questioned arbitrators'
findings of fact,75 have challenged their interpretation of legal princ-
ples,710 and have required compliance with traditional rules of law7
"if based on substantial evidence." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra note
37.
72 Matter of Wilkins, supra note 62.
73 Hyman v. Pottberg's Exr's, 101 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1939). An award was confirmed
when the court found that a settlement following a limitation proceeding in the SS
Morro Castle disaster was equivalent to an agreement to arbitrate and therefore
controlled by Title 9 of the U.S. Code-the U.S. Arbitration Act-which limited court
review to the grounds specified in § 10 thereof.
74 Fudickar v. Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392, 399-400 (1875).
75 Matter of Western Union Tel. Co., discussed supra, text accompanying note 56. The
arbitrator took cognizance of a custom in the trade, and the court deemed this beyond
his authority. Cf. Stefano Berizzi Co. v. Krausz, 239 N.Y. 315, 146 N.E. 436 (1925),
where, in a dispute over the quality of bamboo skewers, the arbitrator made an investi-
gation on his own (without the knowledge of the parties) which Chief judge Cardozo
found amounted to misbehavior and necessitated vacating the award.
76 In Barnes v. Avery, 192 Ga. 874, 16 S.E.2d 861 (1941), an order making an arbi-
tral award the judgment of the court was reversed because the arbitrators' decision went
against the uncontradicted evidence. Here, however, the circumstance was unusual in
that "the entire evidence taken before the arbitrators" was before the court.
77 Industrial Elec. Co. v. Meyer, 85 N.E.2d 415 (Ohio App. 1949), where the
court set aside the award for the arbitrator's error of law in refusing to consider com-
petent evidence.
1960]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
so that the statement that "the determinations of the arbitrator are
final as to the law and the fact" became but a repetitious, hollow
phrase. The temptation to wield judicial power proved too strong;
the warning to arbitrators that their awards "are not sacrosanct" was
superfluous. 7
But despite this rather dark and confused picture, there are, if one
may borrow a poetic metaphor from Justice Douglas, "a few shafts
of light that illuminate" 9 the scene. They make visible a discernible
path that leads in the direction of greater respect for arbitration as
a method of settling disputes, and reveal a growing trend toward a
judicial self-limitation which recognizes that there are bounds to the
scope of judicial review of arbitration. An analysis of recent cases
will point the way.
An Analysis of Recent Cases
Decisions of both the federal and state courts80 reveal the changed
and somewhat chastened attitude of the judiciary. Final awards have
been confirmed with surprising regularity and there is among these
cases not one instance where the parties' privilege to proceed to ar-
bitration has been denied. A motion to stay suit pending arbitration
was granted by the appellate division in a labor dispute where the
proposer of arbitration, the union, had already gone on strike.8" An
arbitrator was not permitted to grant specific performance of an
agreement to purchase a business, 82 but specific performance was de-
creed of a contract to arbitrate a labor dispute not only in the highest
court of New York,88 but in the Supreme Court of the United States,
78 Herzog, in seeking the basis for the distrust and apprehension with which the
courts have viewed the arbitration process, dismisses "professional jealousy" as too
"petty" a reason and finds in the behavior of some arbitrators warrant for a justifiable
concern that judicial safeguards be preserved. He decries "the folksy jurisprudence of
arbitration law." Herzog, supra note 5 at 25.
79 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452 (1957), discussed infra,
text accompanying note 120.
80 Typical of the state court decisions are: Straus v. North Hollywood Hosp. Inc., 150
Cal. App. 2d 306, 309 P.2d 541 (1957); Danbury Rubber Co. v. Local 402, 145
Conn. 53, 138 A.2d 783 (1958); Connoyer v. American T.V. & Radio Co., 249 Minn.
577, 83 N.W.2d 409 (1957); Potoker v. Brooklyn Eagle, 2 N.Y.2d 553, 141 N.E.2d 841
(1957); Rosa v. Transport Operators Co., 45 N.J. Super. 438, 133 A.2d 24 (1957).
Some federal decisions are: Compania Panemena Maritima v. J. E. Hurley Lumber
Co., 244 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1957); Gramling v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. 151 F. Supp.,
853 (W.D.S.C. 1957), Arlington Towers Land Corp. v. John McShain, Inc., 150 F.
Supp. 904 (D.D.C. 1957).
81 Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957).
82 General Fuse Co. v. Sightmaster Corp. 7 Misc. 2d 997, 162 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Sup.
Ct. Westchester County 1957). The award was held to exceed the scope of the sub-
mission; the party had only an option to buy and could not be obliged to purchase.
83 Potoker v. Brooklyn Eagle, supra note 80.
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in a significant opinion by justice Douglas in Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills."4
Certain of these cases raise familiar issues which were resolved in
favor of the arbitrator, though in an earlier day they might well have
been decided the other way. In Arlington Towers Land Corp. v. John
McShain, Inc.,85 the dispute arose between the owner of a huge building
project and the building contractor, and was chiefly concerned with
the addition to, or deletion from, the building of items referred to in
the basic plans and specifications. After suit was filed the parties
chose to arbitrate to determine "the reasonable value of the additions
and deletions," thus raising the question whether the award of the
arbitrator allowing a net credit to the Land Corporation should be
confirmed or vacated. The charges against the arbitrator were that
he "determined matters not within the terms of the arbitration agree-
ment," that he failed to afford the petitioner an opportunity to be
heard on all relevant issues, that he took ex parte evidence, and that
his award showed bias and prejudice, for the arbitrator had concealed
a prior business relationship between himself and the defendants.
The court found none of these charges substantiated, although it was
necessary for it to look into the merits of the controversy in order to
do so. As to the charge that the arbitrator's computations were in
error, the language of the court is noteworthy:
The Arbitrator was expected to utilize his own knowledge and ex-
perience in appraising the conflicting claims of both sides.. . . When
an arbitrator is himself an expert in the field of the arbitrated con-
troversy, he is empowered to exercise a discretion predicated upon the
length and area of his expertness . . . and he may rely on his own find-
ings even though they be in conflict with testimony offered him.8 6
The fact that the arbitrator obtained information from one or more
persons employed by him was held not to negate the fact that "he
did not accept the findings of those persons as conclusive" but rather
"exercised his own independent judgment upon the information fur-
nished by them." And so the court spoke, although the arbitrator's
findings varied in some respects from what the court would have found.
Gramling v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,87 arising in the South
Carolina District Court, is similarly concerned with a monetary
determination by an arbitrator. The question was submitted to a
board of six who were to determine the damages suffered when plain-
84 353 U.S. 448 (1957), discussed infra, text accompanying note 120.
85 Note 80, supra.
86 Arlington Towers Land Corp. v. John McShain, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 904, 927
(D.D.C. 1957).
87 Note 80, supra.
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tiff's peach orchard was sprayed with a product purchased from de-
fendant. Defendant, in making its motion to set aside the award,
placed in evidence the affidavits of two arbitrators who had refused
to sign the award. The defendant used this refusal as a basis to
challenge the award as so excessive as to amount to fraud. The court
found defendant's charges unacceptable and that the affidavits of the
two arbitrators who did not participate in the award were not admis-
sible, as the testimony of an arbitrator cannot be admitted to impeach
his findings. The court concluded that the only way to appeal from
the award was by a motion to set aside or modify and that there were
no grounds for such a motion on the facts of this case. It is important
to observe that here, as in Arlington Towers, the arbitration agree-
ment specifically provided that the award "shall be final and binding
and that neither party will appeal therefrom." This fact was not
stressed in the Arlington Towers case, although it may have been a
factor in the court's decision. In the instant case, however, it was
accorded special weight: "The defendant is bound by its contract to
accept the award as final, and not to appeal from it. If either party
could now attack the award, that contract would be meaningless."8
A like provision, even more forcefully worded,89 was held invalid as
"contrary to public policy and ineffective to prevent judicial actions"
in McCullough v. Clinch-Mitchell Constr. Co. 90 This is representative
of the general view that individuals are not to be permitted to con-
tract themselves out of court. But arbitration under a submission
agreement expressly entered into after suit has commenced, as in
these two cases, can well be deemed an exception to such a rule.
In the case of Rosa v. Transport Operators Co.,91 the New Jersey
appellate division upheld an award with regard to the issue submitted
to the arbitrator, but concluded that the award was not dispositive of
a matter alleged by counterclaim as to which the arbitrator had made no
decision. In this action brought for back pay due as a result of wrong-
ful discharge, the employer, who was engaged in the trucking business,
counter-claimed that its vehicles had been damaged as a result of the
plaintiff's negligence. The issue of negligence was not before the arbi-
trator; the only question submitted was "whether Rosa was wrongfully
discharged." It was argued that the question of negligence was included
in the broader one of "wrongful discharge" since, if negligence had
88 151 F. Supp. 853, 856 (W.D.S.C. 1957).
89 ".. . each and every of said parties hereby waives any and all right of action,
suit or suits, or other remedy, in law or otherwise, under this agreement, or arising out
of the same."
90 71 F.2d 17, 19 (8th Cir. 1934).
91 45 N.J. Super. 438, 133 A.2d 24 (1957).
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been found, the discharge would not have been wrongful. The court
recognized that "an arbitrator does not always decide a case according
to strict legal principles" (nor is he required to), but nevertheless it
looked into the rule of law applied by the arbitrator. Finding no men-
tion of negligence, but rather that this aspect of the matter had not
been dealt with, the court ruled that the plaintiff could not receive the
back pay awarded until the issue of negligence had been determined
in the court below. The court further found that, in any event, the
controversy over negligence was not "an arbitrable matter" under the
terms of the labor agreement, which was limited to "the terms or
conditions of employment." Thus, the award was upheld, but deci-
sion of a question outside the scope of the arbitrator's authority re-
quired that it be held in abeyance.
The judicial requirement that the parties express in clear language
the matters to be arbitrated was not applied in Cournoyer v. American
Television & Radio Co. 2 There, in a suit upon an arbitrator's award
of damages to aggrieved employees, although the wording of the
agreement was found to be "ambiguous and unclear," the interpre-
tation by the arbitrators of a provision as to seniority in a collective
bargaining agreement was upheld as not modifying the terms of the
agreement. The arbitrators were "free to construe or interpret the
contract as their best judgment guided them."
The mere fact that this Court might well arrive at a different conclu-
sion in interpreting the two subsections . . . is not of itself a justifiable
ground for setting aside the arbitration award.93
Another case in which the arbitrator's construction of a contract
term was accepted, though in a commercial rather than a labor arbi-
tration case, was Capelin v. Kleinm4 There, the New York appellate
division, in a per curiam opinion, upheld the award as "unassailable"
because the arbitrators "acted well within the scope of the powers
conferred upon them by the parties when they construed the contract
so as to determine that the adjustments were repayable by the sellers
in cash." The sellers had claimed that the agreement called for pro-
rated payments rather than a lump sum.
O'Malley v. Petroleum Maintenance Co. 5 presents an anomalous
situation, for the arbitrators proceeded to render an award at the
direction of the court although it is clear that they felt they were
92 249 Minn. 577, 83 N.W.2d 409 (1957).
93 Id. at 581, 83 N.W.2d at 412.
94 3 App. Div. 2d 899, 162 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 3 NY.2d 911, 145
NE.2d 873 (1957).
95 48 Cal. 2d 107, 308 P.2d 9 (1957).
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exceeding their powers under the collective bargaining agreement.
The action arose on appeal 6 from a judgment of the California Su-
perior Court confirming an arbitral award in favor of the union in a
dispute over the discharge of an employee, one Semmett. The collec-
tive agreement made no specific mention of discharge though a
grievance procedure was outlined. The superior court ignored the
question whether the discharge was arbitrable, but, by ordering the
arbitration to proceed "on the merits of the discharge," in effect de-
termined itself that it was arbitrable. A submission agreement was
drawn specifying two questions to be answered by a panel of three arbi-
trators. The first concerned the arbitrability of the discharge; the sec-
ond inquired whether the discharge of Semmett was proper. In a four
to three decision, the Supreme Court of California upheld the judg-
ment of the superior court affirming the award with the statement that
"the merits of the controversy between the parties are not subject to
judicial review." But the truth of the matter is that the court was
affirming a decision on the merits; when the lower court decided that
the issue as to discharge was arbitrable, that went to the merits of the
controversy over the meaning of the collective agreement, just as the
determination whether the discharge was proper was a decision on the
merits as to that phase of the case. At one and the same time, there-
fore, the court did and did not decide the case "on the merits."
In Straus v. North Hollywood Hosp. Inc.,97 the court assumed a
liberal attitude in affirming the award of the arbitrators, perhaps be-
cause their decision was just and because it was in harmony with
sound legal principle and the court's own view of the law. There ex-
isted an agreement between the doctor and the hospital that the latter
would furnish Dr. Straus with certain space, facilities, services and
equipment for the conduct on its premises of a clinical pathology
laboratory. In return the hospital was to retain a certain percentage
of the gross monthly billings for the services the doctor performed.
The agreement provided for arbitration and that the "arbitrators could
terminate the contract." Upon submission of the subsequent dispute
to arbitration, it was decided that the contract be terminated and that
the doctor was to receive a sum as compensation. The hospital charged
that the arbitrators had exceeded their power in making a monetary
award since they had found that the hospital did not "wrongfully
breach the contract." The court's view was that since Dr. Straus had
96 The California Code Civ. Proc. § 1293, states that an order directing arbitration
is not appealable. The original appeal from the order directing arbitration was
therefore dismissed, and the case now arises after the award has been made.
97 150 Cal. App. 2d 306, 309 P.2d 541 (1957).
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rendered substantial performance, he was entitled to compensatory
damages for the loss of his contractual rights under the contract, and
the hospital was thus precluded from receiving any unjust enrichment.
Since the legal theory preventing unjust enrichment may not have
been within the arbitrator's ken, he was led to a result that the
court deemed just and equitable purely as a consequence of his own
good judgment. Nevertheless, the court was satisfied since the out-
come accorded with its view of the law.
In Matter of Staklinski,8 an unusual award was confirmed which
granted specific performance of a contract for personal services. Had
the decision lain purely in the realm of substantive law, it might have
been otherwise, for traditionally a court of equity will not enforce
specific performance of contracts to render personal services 9 Little
wonder then, that the New York Court of Appeals divided four to
two. In this case the services, those of the production manager, were
peculiarly personal, requiring the exercise of a high degree of skill and
business judgment. It was the view of the majority that the arbitrator
was empowered, by the terms of the contract which adopted the rules
of the American Arbitration Association, to grant equitable relief in-
cluding specific performance, and there was nothing against public
policy in enforcing the award in this case. Since the award was valid,
the court could see no reason for vacating it and therefore was
obliged, under section 1461 of the New York Civil Practice Act, to
order its confirmation. Thus, as was said in the opinion of the lower
court,'100 "arbitration may provide relief in circumstances and on con-
ditions which even a court has no power to grant."
In another recent New York case, Saks & Co., Inc. v. Women's Shoe
Salespeople Committee,' a divided court (three to two) denied the
employer's motion for a stay of arbitration of a grievance dispute
concerned with whether or not an employee was entitled to both
severance pay and pension plan benefits. The employer contended
there was no arbitrable issue because the pension plan by its terms
was to be administered and interpreted exclusively by a committee
set up for that very purpose. The court conceded that disputes in-
volving the administration and interpretation of the pension plan as
such were not arbitrable, but asserted that here a different question
98 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78 (1959), aff'g 6 App. Div. 2d 565, 180 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st
Dep't 1958). See Notes, 45 Cornell L.Q. 580 (1960); 1 B.C. Indus. & Comm. L. Rev.
101 (1959); 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 961 (1959); 73 Harv. L. Rev. 776 (1960).
09 Sanquirico v. Benedetti, 1 Barb. 315 (N.Y. 1847) (opera singer could not be
compelled to sing). And see Walsh, Equity § 66 (1930).
14 6 App. Div. 2d 565, 570, 180 N.Y.S.2d 20, 27 (1st Dep't 1958).
101 9 App. Div. 2d 325, 192 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1st Dep't 1959).
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was presented. Judge Breitel went to great pains to spell out the
nature of the arbitrable issue, explaining just how it would be possible
for an arbitrator to reach the "rational and logical" conclusion that
there is a controlling difference between retirement benefits and sever-
ance pay.1 2 At the same time the judge disaffirmed any intention of
usurping the arbitrator's function by construing the collective bar-
gaining agreement, for "that is within the province of the arbi-
trators."103
The last case to be considered in this series is the remarkable opin-
ion of Judge Medina in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,
Inc.,'O° in which he construed the Federal Arbitration Act in a way
most favorable to the advancement of commercial arbitration. The
learned judge recognized that the act represented a congressional
design "to remove the hostility of the Judiciary and make the benefits
of arbitration generally available to the business world,"0 5 adding
that "any doubts as to the construction of the Act ought to be re-
solved in line with its liberal policy of promoting arbitration.' ' °6
In the Robert Lawrence Co. case, action was brought by a Massa-
chusetts buyer against a New York seller claiming damages for fraud
in the inducement of the contract for the sale of goods (woolen
fabric), the terms of which were contained in two documents before
the court-an order and a confirmation order, both having the same
provision for arbitration. The opinion is broad and has several as-
pects,' 0 7 but the one of special interest here is the question reached
102 The dissenting opinion takes a position in accord with the rule of the Cutler-
Hammer case, text accompanying note 50 supra, that where the language plainly
can have but only one meaning, there is nothing to dispute and therefore no arbitrable
issue. But the majority opinion illustrates that the New York courts are moving away
from what has been termed the Cutler-Hammer doctrine.
103 9 App. Div. 2d 325, 329, 192 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1006 (Ist Dep't 1959). In another
arbitration case decided the same day by judge Brietel, the seller of a vessel was com-
pelled to proceed to arbitration of a dispute with the buyer over the fitness of the ship.
The opinion ably outlines the functioning of arbitration as an independent process and
proclaims a "hands-off" policy for the courts. Transpacific Transport Corp. v. Sirena
Shipping Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 316, 193 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1st Dep't 1959).
104 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 28 U.S.L. Week 3259 (U.S. March 7,
1960) (No. 659).
105 271 F.2d at 407.
106 Id. at 410.
107 Judge Medina tackled questions left open by the United States Supreme -Court
in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956). Among these questions
were those concerning the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act in diversity cases,
and whether the body of law created by that act is substantive or procedural in charac-
ter. The Judge stated that the act must apply in diversity cases because to rule otherwise
"would emasculate [it]." He saw no issue under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938) (which case obliges federal courts to follow state court holdings on matters of
state law) because the act directed the creation of "a new body of substantive law rela-
tive to arbitration agreements affecting commerce or maritime transactions," a field in
which the congressional power to regulate is exclusive and undisputed. This new body
of substantive law, he said, would be equally applicable in state or federal courts and
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after the preliminary determination that the Federal Arbitration Act
applies in diversity cases, namely, whether fraud in the mere induce-
ment of the basic contract, of which the agreement to arbitrate is a
part, permeated the whole contract so as to invalidate the arbitration
clause. The court ruled that, because the two are separable,"' it did
not. Therefore, the issue of fraud may be left to the determination of
the arbitrator where the arbitration provision of the contract is broad
enough to encompass that issue, as here. Judge Medina looked to the
intention of the parties and said, significantly,
What is the proper construction and interpretation of the arbitration
clause? Did the parties intend the arbitration proceedings to encompass
a charge of fraud in the inducement to make the principal contract
for delivery of the merchandise? We think it is clear that the parties
did just that. It would be hard to imagine an arbitration clause having
greater scope than the one before us. Certainly fraud in the inducement
is a "complaint, controversy or question which may arise with respect
to this contract that cannot be settled by the parties thereto." And we
fail to perceive any rational basis for thinking that the issue is of such
a character that only the courts can resolve it. We think that the
charge of fraud in the inducement comes squarely within the phrase-
ology of this particular agreement and that nothing short of a renas-
cence of the old judicial hostility to arbitration could evolve a con-
trary ruling. (Emphasis added.) 10 9
The opinion concludes with an examination of the New York law and
the observation that, had the court felt compelled to apply the law
of that state, the decision reached would have been contrary, due to
the holding of the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Wrap-
Vertiser Corp.10 Briefly, the parties had agreed to arbitrate any
question concerning the validity, interpretation or performance of the
contract, a distributor's franchise agreement. Wrap-Vertiser Cor-
poration petitioned to stay arbitration of that portion of one Plotnick's
claim for damages which was based upon fraud and misrepresentation
inducing him to enter into the contract. The motion to stay arbitration
of the issue of fraud was granted (although other aspects of the
presented no question of state-created rights under Erie. As to the nature of the federal
law thus to be created, the opinion states, at 271 F.2d 409:
We hold that the body of law thus created is substantive not procedural in char-
acter and that it encompasses questions of interpretation and construction as well
as questions of validity, revocability and enforceability of arbitration agreements
affecting interstate commerce or maritime affairs, since these two types of legal
questions are inextricably intertwined.
10s By the same token, if the arbitration dause were induced by fraud that would
not invalidate the basic contract, but would simply require that the issue of fraud in the
inducement of the arbitration clause be tried by the court, and if fraud should be found
to exist, "there can be no arbitration." 271 F.2d at 411.
109 271 F.2d at 411-12.
110 3 N.Y.2d 17, 143 N.E.2d 366 (1957).
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controversy were found arbitrable), the court asserting that even
though there was no denial of the existence of the contract, this ques-
tion was not properly determinable by the arbitrator, but was one for
the court to decide. In Robert Lawrence, Judge Medina noted the
"strong dissent" by Judge Burke,"1 and characterized the approach
of the New York Court of Appeals as "too narrow," although temper-
ing his remarks with the statement that perhaps the arbitration clause
in Wrap-Vertiser was not as broad as "the arbitration clause before
US."M
12
The varied facts of these cases and the special factors peculiar to
each make it unwise to make any strong assertions as to their import.
But surely there can be discerned a more lenient attitude toward ar-
bitration in contradistinction to what Judge Frank refers to as "the
old and now generally rejected judicial aversion.'"' This friendlier
atmosphere finds expression also in the labor field where an agreement
to arbitrate in compliance with the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement is specifically enforced, whether it be by way of granting
a motion made by a union that the cause proceed to arbitration, 1 4
or by way of granting a stay of court action to achieve the same
purpose." 5
Il1 judge Burke viewed the language of the arbitration clause as showing that the
parties intended "that all questions of interpretation and performance were to be
decided by arbitration." 3 N.Y.2d at 21, 143 N.E.2d at 368.
112 271 F.2d at 412. It may be that Judge Medina's decision in the Lawrence case
is in conflict with a case decided a few weeks earlier in the Sixth Circuit, American
Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 269 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1959),
although they are distinguishable on their facts. American Airlines is likewise a
diversity case, but there was no element of fraud. Action was brought for a declara-
tory judgment, and other incidental relief, in a dispute over rental fees and charges for
the use of airport facilities for a renewal period, a matter referrable to arbitration under
the terms of the lease agreement. A question existed as to whether the Air Board, a
municipal corporation, could delegate to arbitrators the authority to make such a
determination. Although acknowledging that the agreement was an interstate contract,
valid under the Federal Arbitration Act, under the special circumstances here, the
court concluded that it was enforceable only if "valid and enforceable in accordance
with ordinary contract principles under applicable State and Federal law." 269 F.2d
at 817. A major part of the opinion was devoted to an attempt to find the Kentucky
law, but the courts of that state appear not to have spoken in the matter. The court
was hesitant to use its discretion to render a declaratory judgment because questions
of state policy were involved. The case was remanded to the District Court with
the direction to stay proceedings, although retaining jurisdiction "pending determina-
tion by the Kentucky courts of the questions of Kentucky law." Id. at 826. The parties
were urged to move diligently for declaratory relief in the Kentucky courts.
11 Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298, 301 (2d Cir.
1956).
"14 Potoker v. Brooklyn Eagle, 2 N.Y.2d 553, 141 N.E.2d 841 (1957) (a dispute over
claims for severance, accrued vacation, holiday and sick leave pay which was found
to be an arbitrable issue under the arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agree-
ment). See Koretz, "Labor Relations Law," 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1391, 1397 (1956).
115 Signal-Stat Corp. case, supra note 113 at 301. The employer sued the labor
union for damages occasioned by a strike which violated a "no-strike clause." A stay
was granted to the union pending arbitration in accordance with the United States
Arbitration Act. The language of the arbitration clause was a decisive factor in the
[Vol. 45
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION
Specific Performance"6 of Agreements to Arbitrate Grievance Dis-
putes Under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947
Collective bargaining agreements, after a careful delineation of
grievance procedures, customarily conclude with an arbitration clause
designed as the final means of reaching an agreement when the pro-
cedures outlined have failed. Its usual form is as follows:
Arbitration. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this agreement,
all disputes, differences or grievances arising out of the interpretation
or application of the provisions of this Agreement that shall not have
been satisfactorily settled within two weeks following the procedure
hereinabove set forth shall, at the request of either party, be promptly
submitted to arbitration. (Emphasis added.) 117
As might be expected with respect to any matter involving the "in-
terpretation or application" of an agreement, questions as to meaning
are raised by labor and management, with almost unbecoming regu-
larity it seems, so that problems are posed both for the arbitrators and
the courts.
Whether or not an order should issue compelling the parties to
arbitrate grievance disputes is a question that frequently has puzzled
the federal courts.118  A decision of far-reaching significance in this
area is the much discussed" 9 Textile Workers Union, C.I.O. v. Lincoln
result, for Judge Frank, quoting the clause, "All disputes, grievances or differences are
arbitrable," commented: "We can hardly imagine more broadly inclusive language."
Ibid.
116 Specific performance, which came into existence as a remedy through develop-
ment of the equity jurisdiction of our courts, simply seeks to enforce the individual's
obligation to perform his contract. However, since courts are reluctant to compel
parties to act, there must be a showing that the remedy at law is inadequate, as
well as the bringing to bear of whatever other equitable considerations would lead
a court to require a party to keep his promise. McClintock, Equity 126-30 (1948).
117 This clause was before the Court in Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co.,
251 F.2d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 1957). Compare the provision in controversy in Local 149,
American Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. General Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922, 925 (1st Cir.
1957):
Article XV Arbitration. 1. Any grievance which involves the interpretation or
application of this Agreement, and which remains unsettled after having been
fully processed pursuant to the provisions of Article XIV [Grievance Procedure]
shall be submitted to arbitration upon request of either the Union or the Com-
pany provided such request is made within 90 days after the decision of the
Company has been given to the Union pursuant to Article XIV. In each case,
the arbitrator shall be selected and the arbitration proceeding conducted pursuant
to procedures mutually satisfactory to the Company and the Union.
This is a somewhat more elaborate clause than in the Sperry Gyroscope case.
118 Certiorari was granted in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
449 (1957), "because of the importance of the problem and the contrariety of views in
the courts."119 Bickel and Wellington, "Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case," 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1957); Feinsinger, "Enforcement of Labor
Agreements-A New Era in Collective Bargaining," 43 Va. L. Rev. 1261 (1957);
Bunn, "Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction to Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements,"
43 Va. L. Rev. 1247 (1957); Notes, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 1123 (1957); 43 A.B.J. 736(1957) ; 3 Viii. L. Rev. 109 (1957) ; 11 Vand. L. Rev. 243 (1957).
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Mills,2 ' in which the Supreme Court of the United States gave
strong backing to specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
grievance disputes.
In Lincoln Mills, suit was brought by the union to compel the
employer to arbitrate grievances concerning work loads and work
assignments. It was held that an agreement to arbitrate contained in
a collective bargaining contract between labor and management, in
an industry affecting interstate commerce, will be specifically enforced
through section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947."1 Justice Douglas, in an opinion that has been criticized (not
wholly justifiably) as failing "to come to grips with the issue,"' and
as placing an onerous burden upon the federal courts with respect to
complex problems of labor relations which they are ill-equipped to
handle,2 makes it clear that the part of a collective bargaining agree-
ment to which the Court is directing its attention, and with respect
to which "the tenor of the [legislative] history" is clear, is the
agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes. It was determined that sec-
tion 301(a) "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal
law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements and
includes within that federal law specific performance of promises to
arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining agreements.'"1 Jus-
tice Douglas equates "agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes"
with "agreements not to strike," and finds a federal policy requiring
their enforcement when he says,
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro
quo for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation
does more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor
organizations. It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should
enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations
and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way. 25
Subsequent decisions in the federal courts reflect the confusion into
which the directive "to fashion" a remedy that "will effectuate this
120 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
121 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958). Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
122 Bickel and Wellington, supra note 119 at 37, where it is caustically stated that
a decision of "far-reaching consequences" was determined without opinion.
123 Feinsinger, supra note 119 at 1295, says "Lincoln Mills imposes a heavy re-
sponsibility not only on the federal courts but also on labor and management to
preserve the basic values of the institution of free and flexible collective bargaining."
124 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
125 Id. at 455.
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policy" has thrown the judges. 26 Two cases are of particular interest
in this connection because they so plainly show judicial awareness of
the criticisms leveled against the handling of labor arbitrations.'2 7
Both cases are concerned with the determination whether or not there
is an arbitrable dispute. In both the federal judges feel constrained
by the decision in Lincoln Mills, yet they seem to tackle the problem
with gloved hands for fear they will overstep the bounds of judicial
review.
In Local 149, American Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. General Elec.
Co.,L28 action was brought by the union to compel arbitration of a
grievance concerning job classification which the employer defended
by pleading there was no arbitrable issue. Judge Magruder began by
saying, "We have been much perplexed by this case," and continued
We are aware of a viewpoint urged in responsible quarters that the
interests of effective labor arbitration would best be served by commit-
ting to the arbitrator in the first instance the question of arbitrability,
that is, the question whether there is any issue to be arbitrated under
the collective bargaining agreement. It is said that a collective bargain-
ing contract is a very special type of document, in respect of interpre-
tation, as to which an arbitrator has certain advantages over a court;
that a collective bargaining agreement, though embracing a multitude
of terms covering numerous employees working at various tasks, can-
not be expected to have pin-pointed each of many problems to be dealt
with in relations between the management and the union; .. .There-
fore, it may be desirable in the first instance to have an arbitrator pass
on the threshold question of arbitrability, instead of running the possible
risk that a court, in the guise of ruling on this preliminary question of
the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, may in effect make a ruling upon
the merits of the asserted grievance. (Emphasis added.) 129
It is significant that, at the same time that he felt obliged to deny ar-
bitration, Judge Magruder cited articles highly critical of the judicial
attitude toward labor arbitration. He rested the court's decision upon
126 In A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 155 F. Supp. 739 (E.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958), Judge Bruch-
hausen of the District -Court for the Eastern District of New York, flying in the face
of the prohibitions of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, granted specific performance of
a "no-strike clause" of a collective bargaining agreement, interpreting the broad
language of the opinion in Lincoln Mills-"collective bargaining contracts were made
'equally binding and enforceable on both parties'"--as meaning that all provisions
of collective bargaining agreements were to be enforced. It is submitted that Justice
Douglas' opinion, carefully studied, does not lead to the conclusion reached by Judge
Bruchhausen, for the holding of Lincoln Mills is limited to specific enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate only.
127 See Cox, "Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 591,
604 (1954) (referring to decisions which reveal "either deep-seated judicial distrust
for labor arbitration or else a total misunderstanding of problems in labor relations").
See also, Mayer, "Judicial 'Bulls' in the Delicate China Shop of Labor Arbitration,"
2 Lab. L.J. 502 (1951), an article highly critical of judicial meddling.
128 250 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
129 250 F.2d at 926.
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the definition in the collective bargaining agreement of those matters
that were to be submitted to arbitration; he did not find job descrip-
tions among them. Since the absence of any such language left
nothing for an arbitrator to interpret or apply, the court could reach
no conclusion but that the employer had not agreed to arbitrate the
question of the arbitrability of the particular grievance set forth.13 0
The language with which Judge Magruder affirmed not only the power,
but the duty, of the court to determine whether the parties had agreed
to arbitrate the contested issue, is impressive:
But when one of the parties needs the aid of a court, and asks the
court for a decree ordering specific performance of a contract to arbi-
trate, we think that the court, before rendering such a decree, has the
inescapable obligation to determine as a preliminary matter that the
defendant has contracted to refer such issue to arbitration, and has
broken this promise. (Emphasis added.)1 31
In the second case, Engineers' Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 32
the question before the Second Circuit was whether merit increases
were included among the issues to be arbitrated under a comprehensive
clause in the collective bargaining agreement. The labor union sought
arbitration on the ground that the raises given to certain employees,
who were transferred to a new plant in Salt Lake City, were intended
to afford to such employees incentive to accept the transfer rather than
resting on a "merit basis only" as was required by the terms of the
agreement between the union and the company. The company coun-
tered with the recital in the contract that "merit increases are at the
130 Id. at 930.
131 Id. at 927. In Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents' Union, 258 F.2d
516 (1st Cir. 1958), Chief Judge Magruder reaffirmed his holding in Local 149.
Plaintiff employer sought a declaratory judgment under § 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 to the effect that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction
to arbitrate a grievance arising out of the discharge of an employee, and further sought
injunctive relief precluding the union from proceeding with the arbitration. The
union counterclaimed seeking enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement
which named the American Arbitration Association as director of the arbitration
procedure. Chief Judge Magruder said: "We have no disposition to whittle away our
holding in Local No. 149, etc. v. General Electric Co. . . . It seems to us that in the case
at bar the district court did not sufficiently adhere to the teaching of Local No. 149,
etc .... " 258 F.2d at 517. After voicing this admonition the court of appeals proceeded to
vacate the order below that the parties proceed to arbitration and remanded the
case to the district court for a decision on the question whether the union had pro-
ceeded with sufficient diligence to press for arbitration. Compliance with this re-
quirement in the collective bargaining agreement was a condition precedent to arbitra-
tion, the court found, and posed an issue of arbitrability which must be resolved by the
court as a preliminary matter. 258 F.2d at 522. Upon remand, in determining the
issue of timeliness, Judge Wyzanski held that the union's demand for arbitration
was submitted with reasonable diligence (although there was a delay amounting to
almost a year) because no specific time limit was set in the collective bargaining
agreement and the employer, had it been suffering any hurt, could have ended the
delay "at any moment." Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents' Union,
171 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 268 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1959).
132 251 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 932 (1958).
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sole discretion of the employer," so there could be no arbitrable issue.
The court found that this contention begged the question, and held
that a determination of the true nature of the basis for the increases
was properly arbitrable.
What puzzled Judge Waterman, however, was the method by which
the court could resolve the threshold inquiry concerning the arbitra-
bility of the dispute without, at the same time, making a decision on
the merits which, it was acknowledged, was properly the arbitrator's
function.
The difficulty in the present case, as the court below recognized, is
that a determination of the arbitrability of the grievance depends upon
the same facts relevant to a decision by an arbitrator upon the merits
of the grievance. .... But, merely because there is an identity of
issues in the two proceedings, the court is not relieved of its duty to
determine whether an arbitrable dispute exists. (Emphasis added.)' 33
By drawing a fine distinction between the quantum of proof neces-
sary to determine arbitrability and that required to render a decision
on the merits, Judge Waterman endeavored not to detract from the
arbitrator's powers:
It should be observed, however, that even in a case such as the pres-
ent one, where the same facts are determinative of both arbitrability
and the merits of the controversy, an order compelling the parties to
submit to arbitration does not impinge upon the power of the arbitra-
tor to decide the merits of the dispute. The difference between the two
proceedings is in the quantum of proof necessary for the moving party
to obtain relief. In the arbitration hearing, the party seeking relief
must fully establish his claim that the opposing party has violated
the contract. Determination of arbitrability only requires that the
moving party produce evidence which tends to establish his claim.
Once the tendency of the evidence to support the claim is established,
it is then the function of the arbitrator to weigh all the evidence and to
then determine whether the contract was broken. (Emphasis added.)' 34
This long established power of the courts to ensure there is an
arbitrable issue was once again affirmed in Refinery Employees Union
v. Continental Oil Co., 35 wherein Judge Wisdom placed strong re-
liance upon the opinion of Chief Justice Magruder in Local 149,
American Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. General Elec. Co. 8' In
133 251 F.2d at 137.
'34 Ibid.
135 268 F.2d 447 (th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
136 Discussed supra, text accompanying note 128. This case is remarked upon as
judge Magruder's "most celebrated post-Lincoln Mills case" in Harry H. Wellington's
tribute to the Chief Judge. "Judge Magruder and the Labor Contract," 72 Harv. L.
Rev. 1268, 1292 (1959). In analyzing Judge Magruder's labor arbitration opinions the
author finds that in pre-arbitration cases (like the Local 149 case) the eminent jurist
"does not view his role as limited, because of an institutional incompetence, by any notion
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the Refinery Employees Union case, the controversy arose when
the company foreman, to the detriment of another employee, wrongly
assigned overtime work to an employee whose job classification did
not warrant it. The company acknowledged the foreman's error but
refused to comply with the union's demand that the wronged employee
be paid for the task that should have been his. The company refused
to make an exception to its "no work-no pay" policy, although offer-
ing other concessions. The union invoked arbitration, but again the
company balked, refusing to submit to arbitration anything more
than the question whether there had been a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement, and insisting that the matter of remedy for the
breach, if any be found, should be the subject of negotiation between
the company and the union. The union rejected these limitations upon
arbitration and maintained that the right to make an award was a
matter of interpretation of the contract for the arbitrator to determine.
As agreement could not be reached upon the arbitrable issue, the
union brought this action for specific performance of the agreement
to arbitrate. In its opinion the court acknowledged that the question
before it was the difficult one 137 of determining the propriety of the
district court in limiting the arbitrable issue by holding that the
parties did not intend that the arbitrator determine the remedy, but
that he had authority only to decide whether there had been a breach
of the collective bargaining agreement. The judgment below was
affirmed, the court finding, upon examining the arbitration clause, that
it was not a broad grant of authority, but a limited clause that did not
purport to cover any and all disputes and that was silent as to the
power of arbitrators to provide a remedy. 138 The narrowness of the
arbitration clause, therefore, led to the conclusion that an award of
damages was not within the scope of the arbitration agreement since
of restraint. To the contrary, his approach in these cases is the same as it would be in
any case which calls upon a judge to interpret a contract." His assessment of the judicial
role in labor arbitration is not one of abnegation, but of a duty to assume the con-
gressional grant of jurisdiction that § 301 directs and to maintain by decisional excellence
the confidence thus reposed in the judiciary. Judge Magruder, like many another judge,
views with skepticism "the view in responsible quarters" that would limit the functions
of the courts in labor arbitration.
137 Lincoln Mills makes it clear that the court has jurisdiction. But a most difficult
question remains, namely what is the proper role of the district court in a pre-
arbitration contest? ... In Lincoln Mills .. . the Supreme Court did not devote
itself to any of the problems the lower federal courts were bound to face in
subsequent arbitration cases under section 301.
Wellington, note 136 supra at 1283-84.
138 Whether or not the contract speaks about a remedy is immaterial, according
to Archibald Cox, who says that the arbitrator's power to fashion remedies is so
generally accepted today that "the power to determine whether a collective-bargaining
agreement has been violated carries the implied power to grant a remedy for the viola-
tion. . . .Not a word in the average labor contract expresses the intention." Cox,
"Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1494 (1959).
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it was not a "difference relating to the interpretation or performance"
of the collective bargaining agreement. The ruling was that arbitra-
tion should proceed and that the arbitrator was to determine the issue
of work assignment, but that his authority did not extend to the fixing
of damages. This was a matter, said the court, to be decided at the
bargaining table.' 39
Justice Brown 4 ° vehemently disagreed with the holding of the ma-
jority, accusing them of tenaciously holding on to their judicial pre-
rogative to decide disputes in a cause properly referable to arbitration,
and of displaying a jealous watchfulness "that has long since earned
a decent interment."' 4 ' He went even further and saw in the opinion
the same old effort to sugar-coat what, to the judiciary, has long been
a bitter pill-the idea that someone other than a court can properly ad-
judicate disputes; that in the field of human disputes lawyers and ex-
lawyers as judges alone have the Keys to the Kingdom. 1'
It was Judge Brown's view that the unfortunate effect of the court's
decision was that it could "become the subject of a new and further
one"-that if agreement could not be reached at the bargaining
table to which the parties had been sent, then the issue would once
more be before the courts. In brief, Judge Brown urged that the
failure to give the arbitrator plenary powers simply sowed the seeds
of future industrial conflict. However, this position overlooks the fact
that it was, and by virtue of the court's ruling still is, within the
power of the parties themselves to resolve this conflict by extending
the authority of the arbitrator.
In the view of some, the decision may mark a backward step in
arbitration annals; 1  but in the minds of others,' including this
writer, it stands on sound legal ground and is in conformity with a
139 268 F.2d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 1959).
140 Judge Brown was the lone dissenting judge in Lincoln Mills when it was heard
in the court of appeals, 230 F.2d 81, 89 (5th Cir. 1956). He called upon the Supreme
Court to fashion a body of substantive law in the field of labor arbitration under § 301.
This plea Justice Douglas answered in his opinion in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
141 268 F.2d 447, 460 (5th Cir. 1959).
142 For this diatribe, Judge Brown was sternly taken to task by Chief Judge
Hutcheson, who concurred specially for the avowed purpose of deprecating the dis-
senting opinion.
143 The decision has been condemned as injurious to the efficient settlement of labor-
management differences for both labor and management will now hesitate to turn
to arbitration when there is little hope of a compensatory remedy. Note, 6 Utah L.
Rev. 586, 588 (1959).
'44 The decision has been lauded as upholding the intent of the parties and as
alerting them to "the practical necessity of contract provisions clearly spelling out their
intent with respect to arbitration"; it also has impressed upon labor and management
"the need to face the problem at the bargaining sessions and resolve it in the col-
lective bargaining agreement." Note 43 Marq. L. Rev. 260, 263 (1959).
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literal interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. If, how-
ever, as Professor Cox suggests, 4 5 the settlement of labor disputes
by arbitration is of a peculiar genre-not fitting wholly into the law
of contract or of arbitration, but resting on a sort of amorphous "in-
dustrial jurisprudence"-the court has not decided the issue in relation
to the context in which it arose. But it is submitted that Professor
Cox goes too far in placing upon the courts the onus of resolving
issues that had better be determined through collective bargaining.
If, as he asserts often happens, the parties deliberately choose vague
language because they cannot reach agreement yet "must strike some
kind of a bargain"-if they thus choose to shift the decisional burden
to the court, each side hoping the question will be decided in its favor
-then they may not be heard to complain when the problem is placed
right back in their laps where it belongs.
Another recent labor arbitration case, concerned not with arbi-
trability but with specific performance of an arbitration award under
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, is
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers,"" where the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals assumed a very broadminded atti-
tude toward arbitration. In a controversy over the amount of
back pay due employees who were discharged, the court deemed the
arbitration award so indefinite as not to provide any basis upon which
to calculate the sums due. Despite this incompleteness, however, the
award was upheld. Judge Soper recognized that a final award not
definite and certain in its terms may be vacated for the reason that
"the powers of the arbitrator are exhausted and the award cannot
be resubmitted to him for correction or amendment.'14 7 He noted,
however, that this rule forbidding resubmission was developed when
the courts looked with disfavor upon arbitration proceedings, and that,
in line with the congressional policy favoring arbitration of grievance
disputes which was affirmed in Lincoln Mills, it should not be applied
today in the settlement of employer-employee disputes.
145 Professor Cox ably presents his thesis in Cox, "Reflections Upon Labor Arbitra-
tion," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482 (1959). See especially pp. 1490-93, where he concludes:
The generalities, the deliberate ambiguities, the gaps, the unforeseen contingencies,
and the need for a rule even though the agreement is silent all require a creativeness
in contract administration which is quite unlike the attitude of one construing a
deed, a promissory note, or a 300-page corporate trust indenture. The process of
interpretation cannot be the same because the conditions which determine the
character of the instruments are different.
See also Cox, "Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration," 30 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 247 (1958). Summers earlier expounded a somewhat similar theory in
Summers, "Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the Looking Glass,"
2 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1952).
146 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir.) cert. granted, 361 U.S. 929 (1959).
147 Id. at 332.
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The most difficult decisions faced by the courts, not only in grievance
disputes, but in arbitration generally, 4 ' concern the arbitrability of
disputes-the question whether a controversy of the exact nature as
the one before them was intended by the parties to be included within
the terms of the arbitration provision. Since the participants are at
odds, the court must look for guidance to the wording of the arbitra-
tion clause. Where the language is clear, either encompassing many
matters because of its breadth,' 49 or including but a few due to its
narrowness, 5 ° decision is reached with relative ease. But ambiguous,
poorly drawn arbitration clauses' 51 cause nothing but trouble for the
parties and the courts and hinder the arbitration process. It would
seem to be that it is this weakness, almost more than any other, that
has made it appear that the courts are usurping the arbitrator's func-
tion. This is true not only because the parties, plagued by uncertainty,
have recourse to the courts, but because often the same facts which
are determinative of the question whether there is an arbitrable issue
are as well decisive of the merits of the controversy. 152
Judicial review, as presented herein, has not been confined to de-
cisions on the final arbitration award' 58 (whether to confirm, modify
or vacate it). Instead, it has encompassed a very broad definition
of the term, including within its range the primary determination
of whether there is in fact an agreement to arbitrate'5 as well as such
148 See analysis of recent cases p. 534 supra.
149 Matter of Lipman, 289 N.Y. 76, 43 N.E.2d 817 (1942). In a proceeding to compel
arbitration of a dispute arising from a contract for the sale of shellac, where the
language of the contract was very broad---"any and all controversies arising out of
and in connection with"--it was decreed that the parties should proceed to arbitration.
In Signal-Stat Corp. v. United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), suit was
stayed pending arbitration, the language reading, "all disputes, grievances or differences."
150 In Matter of Berger, 191 Misc. 870, 79 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County),
aff'd mem., 274 App. Div. 789, 81 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1st Dep't 1948) (a motion by the
union to compel arbitration was denied. The arbitration clause did not include
negotiation of a new scale of salaries incident to a "re-opening" provison).
151 In Riverdale Fabrics Corp. v. Tillinghast-Stiles Co., supra note 70, a petition
to compel arbitration was denied, but arbitration was stayed at the behest of the
other party[ The court required clear language showing an intention to surrender
one's right (o resort to the courts.
152 Engin ers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., discussed supra, text accompanying
note 132. Tvo labor cases concerned with whether or not there is an arbitrable issue
are scheduled to be heard by the Supreme Court: United Steelworkers of America
v. American Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 361 U.S. 881 (1959)(reinstatement of an employee the severity of whose injury was questionable con-
stituted a frivolous grievance and was therefore not arbitrable); United Steelworkers
of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 269 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. granted,
361 U.S. 912 (1959) (the employer's right to contract out maintenance work fell within
the functions strictly reserved to management and presented no arbitrable issue).
153 Arlington Towers Land Corp. v. John McShain, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 904 (D.D.C.
1957), discussed supra, text accompanying note 85.
154 Bellmore Dress Co. v. Tanbro Fabric Corp., 115 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1952). In an oral contract for the purchase and sale of goods did an unsigned
purchase order which contained an arbitration clause amount to a contract to arbitrate
within the requirements of N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1449? It was held that it did.
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intermediary proceedings as motions to stay suit until arbitration
can proceed' 55 or resume, and actions to compel specific performance
of the agreement to arbitrate.'56 This was deemed necessary in order
that there might be full appreciation of the scope of the court's ex-
ercise of the reviewing power,'15  which touches more than the final
award.
No sharp distinction has been made herein between commercial and
labor arbitration. Some writers, however, 5 ' have advocated a sepa-
rate law of arbitration suited to the complexities that abound in the
labor relations field. It is an area in which arbitration is viewed as
an alternative to the strike, with the result that arbitration is looked
upon as a solution to the differences of labor and management-one
that will preserve industrial peace. Nevertheless, lab6r arbitration is
still but a part of arbitration law. The settlement of labor disputes
155 Signal-Stat Corp. v. United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957).
156 Matter of Canadian Gulf Line, Ltd., 98 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1938).
157 United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petrol. Co., 222 Fed. 1006, 1009-11
(S.D.N.Y. 1915), wherein Hough, J., criticizes the judicial attitude toward arbitrators
as he traces its historical background:
Yet it is surely a singular view of juridical sanctity which reasons that, because
the Legislature has made a court, therefore everybody must go to the court ...
The courts will scarcely permit any other body of men to even partially perform
judicial work, and will never permit the absorption of all the business growing
out of disputes over a contract by any body of arbitrators, unless compelled to such
action by statute.
This decision, rendered before the existence of modern state and federal arbitration stat-
utes, concerned breach of a charter party; the defendant moved for a stay on the
ground that any dispute arising thereunder was to be "settled in London by arbitration."
It was held that an agreement to arbitrate differences arising under a contract went
to the remedy; therefore, the law of the forum controlled (federal law). The Judge
found that the Supreme Court had ruled "such a complete ouster of jurisdiction"
void; therefore the agreement to arbitrate could not be enforced, although valid in
London where the contract was made.
158 Freidin, "Labor Arbitration and the Courts," Labor Relations Series 47 (1952):
There should be separate statutes dealing with labor arbitration. They ought to
take full account of its special nature and unique function. They should curtail
with sensible severity the power of courts to enjoin arbitrations or vacate or
modify awards. Certainly they should withdraw from the courts and vest in the
arbitrator jurisdiction to determine the arbitrability of a dispute. And they should
recognize and sanction the extraordinary services that a jointly chosen arbitrator
can render to peaceful labor relations, even though his views and methods do not
conform to orthodox judicial standards.
The same view is differently expressed by Syme, "Arbitrability of Labor Disputes," 5
Rutgers L. Rev. 455, 472 (1951):
Labor arbitration has traveled a tortuous road. . . . There have been chaos and
confusion. . . . The basic cause for the dilemma has been the assumption of a
fallacious premise. A parallel has been drawn between commercial and labor
arbitration. The two are entirely dissimilar. Their origin is different, their pur-
poses are disparate and their functioning is antithetic. Commercial arbitration
evolved as a substitute for litigation. The parties either litigated or arbitrated. ...
Labor arbitration is not a substitute for litigation. Labor arbitration is a sub-
stitute for the strike.
One eminent scholar has gone so far as to suggest that "the law stay out" of labor
arbitration. Shulman, "Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations," 68 Harv. L.
Rev. 999, 1024 (1955).
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by arbitration may follow a somewhat different course 59 from com-
mercial arbitrations, but the applicable basic principles remain the
same.
International Arbitration
The international aspects of arbitration, involving, as they often do,
questions of international law, 60 are not the subject of this study, but
they are of tremendous importance and may not pass unmentioned.
International commercial arbitration functions principally under
the control of private interests,' 6 ' e.g., individual business corporations,
affiliated trade associations (the English Cotton Trade Association;
the Corn Trade Association), or the International Chamber of Com-
merce. This latter organization promotes no particular product or
trade but seeks rather to join varied commercial interests. These
different groups promulgate rules and regulations of their own which
must be adhered to as a condition of membership. Professor Heinrich
Kronstein is highly critical of their functioning and sees them as a
form of "private government" which fosters an "extraterritorial arbi-
tration" operating outside the law and reaching its objectives regard-
less of the municipal law of the forum." 2 Yet this cannot be wholly
true, for every arbitration, of necessity, has its roots in the legal sys-
tem of the particular country from which it emanates and is subject
to its national law and rules.163
Professor Kronstein's charge bears some relation to the fact that
with respect to the enforcement of foreign arbitration awards there
seldom exists a judicial review as broad in scope as that prevailing in
the United States in the handling of municipal cases. The courts of
most countries, including our own,' accord full recognition to arbi-
159 Mention is made earlier of the fact that only in labor arbitrations are opinions
regularly rendered. Supra note 19. And it has been said of the process of labor
arbitration that it "comes under frequent fire for its alleged tendency toward 'ex-
cessive legalism.'" Gorske, "Burden of Proof in Grievance Arbitration," 43 Marq.
L. Rev. 135 (1959).
160 Domke, "The Israeli-Soviet Oil Arbitration," 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 787 (1959).
101 National governments have entered the world trade field and agreements are
not uncommon between them and private individuals or corporations. When disputes
arise between the state, or state-controlled agency, and a private person or group,
arbitration may be resorted to. It is not possible to coerce the state, but nations
who enter into private trading relations often do so under commercial treaties "which
expressly disavow immunity in state-trading relations with respect not only to 'suits'
in ordinary courts, but also to arbitration." Domke, "Arbitration of State-Trading
Relations," 24 Law & Contemp. Prob. 317 (1959).
182 Kronstein, "Business Arbitration-Instrument of Private Government," 54 Yale
L.J. 36, 46 (1944).
163 Nussbaum, "Treaties on Commercial Arbitration-A Test of International Private-
Law Legislation," 56 Harv. L. Rev. 219, 243 (1942). Nussbaum's views appear to be at
variance with those of Kronstein.
184 Domke has observed that "a most liberal practice has been followed in the
1960]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
tral awards made in another state. There is sometimes the requirement
that the award first be reduced to a judgment in the country where it
has been obtained, after which suit may be maintained on that judg-
ment. The award is not examined on the merits, the decision being
limited to jurisdictional questions only. This is true in both com-
mon law and civil law countries.165
Furthermore, just as state and federal statutes have been enacted
in the United States to regulate and uphold arbitration, 6 so also in
the international field there has been legislation, in the form of agree-
ments between nations, both bilateral and multilateral, to achieve the
same purpose. These are given expression either in the reciprocally
binding bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation which
are now in force between many nations,'167 or in multilateral conven-
tions such as the Geneva Protocols of 1923 and 1927108 concluded
under the auspices of the League of Nations. The 1923 convention
was designed to uphold the validity of agreements to arbitrate, whether
present or future, while that of 1927 was intended to assure enforce-
ment of foreign arbitration awards within the signatory countries." 9
Arbitration between nations has evolved as the primary means of
settling their differences. Recourse to international arbitration tri-
bunals is a natural phenomenon; national states find in the ad hoc
nature of arbitration a means of settlement which enables them to de-
lineate in advance the issues to be decided so that each country is able
to limit its participation in whatever way it sees fit. Thus is their
sovereign status preserved. For this reason, ad hoc tribunals continue
United States" and he cites Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931),
in support of that statement. Domke, "On the Enforcement Abroad of American
Arbitration Awards," 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 545, 550 (1952). Gilbert v. Burnstine
is a leading case holding that arbitration held in London in accordance with the arbitra-
tion law of Great Britain was to be enforced in the New York courts even though
it was rendered without personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a resident of New
York. But cf. Matter of Amtorg Trading Corp., 304 N.Y. 519, 109 N.E.2d 606 (1952),
where the New York Court of Appeals, in a per curiam opinion granting a stay until
the parties had proceeded to arbitrate their differences in Moscow as agreed, indicated
by way of dictum that if after an award was rendered the American party felt it was
not a fair and impartial determination it could come back to the court and challenge the
award.
165 Bresch, "The International Enforcement of English Arbitral Awards," 2 Bus.
L. Rev. 98 (1955).
166 See supra, text accompanying notes 23 and 24.
167 The first such treaty entered into by the United States was with China, November
4, 1946. Art. VI(4), 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871.
168 International Yearbook on Civil and Commercial Arbitration 239, 240 (Nussbaum
ed. 1928).
169 For a full review of the significance of these Conventions see Nussbaunm, supra
note 163.
Note also the existence of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, concluded June 10, 1958. U.N. Doc. No.
E/Conf. 26/9 Rev. 1 (1958).
[Vol. 45
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION
to be favored, despite the existence since 1922 of a permanent inter-
national tribunal, the International Court of Justice. 170 Arbitration
between foreign governments differs in some measure from arbitration
within the municipal or national law framework, for international
arbitration is regarded as essentially judicial in nature,' 7 ' whereas
domestic arbitration is regarded as a distinct process chosen by the
parties to take them out of court and away from its rigidities.
The question of judicial review does not arise in disputes between
foreign governments, partly because the arbitration process used is by
its very nature already judicial and, to an even greater extent, because
assertion by a state of its rights of sovereignty172 makes compulsion
impossible, as is revealed by the implications of the Interhandel
case.'
7 3
A Limiting Factor
The importance of judicial review of arbitration is not to be mini-
mized, but here, as in the case of administrative adjudications, 74 there
is a limitation upon judicial control that exists independent of any
judicial attitude that may prevail. Such limitation is present by vir-
tue of the fact that only a small fraction of the awards made by ar-
bitrators are ever contested in the courts. 7 5 This is particularly to be
desired in the case of arbitration, as it means that the parties are
170 As originally created in 1922, the world court was known as the Permanent
Court of International Justice. For a study of its functioning, see Lissitzyn, The Inter-
national Court of Justice (1951).
171 Bishop, International Law, Cases and Materials 56 (1954). John Basset Moore
expresses the same view in his remarkable analysis of the international practice of
arbitration between nations in 1 International Adjudications xxiv (1929). judge
Moore, at xliv, quotes the Swiss writer, Dr. Gossweiler, as saying that "what dis-
tinguishes arbitration from other amicable methods of deciding [international] disputes
is its judicial character."
172 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812). Chief
justice Marshall, in referring to the immunities belonging to the independent sovereign
station, said: "One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another, and being
bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his
nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another ... "
173 [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 6. Professor Briggs sharply criticizes the refusal of the
United States to adjudicate its dispute with Switzerland, the American position
being that the matter is purely a question of domestic jurisdiction. Briggs, "Towards
the Rule of Law? United States Refusal to Submit to Arbitration or Conciliation the
Interhandel Case," 51 Am. J. Intl L. 517 (1957). And see the brisk rejoinder of
Jacoby, "Towards the Rule of Law?" 52 Am. J. Int'l L. 107 (1958). Briggs discusses
the case reportorially in 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 307, 547 (1959). See also discussions in
1960 Duke L.J. 73, and 58 Mich. L. Rev. 467 (1960). See generally, Schachter, "The
Enforcement of International judicial and Arbitral Decisions," 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 1
(1960).
174 Gellhorn and Byse, Administrative Law, Case and Comments 641 (1954).
175 A recent article discussing labor arbitration says, "it is impressive how fully
these adjudications are observed. A study some few years ago revealed that out of
thousands of arbitration awards only 3/10 of one per cent are not voluntarily com-
plied with and require the aid of court enforcement." Mathews, "Critical Issues in
Arbitration Practice: Seniority and Discharge Cases," 32 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 37 (1959).
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abiding by their promises and are satisfied with the arbitration process.
When it is otherwise, and the participants are before the court, 7 "
there is cause for concern and judges may well scan what has tran-
spired with a practiced eye. For them to do so is not such a catas-
trophe as one is led to suppose, for the advantages of arbitration may
already be lost.
CONCLUSION
It becomes manifest from a study of court review of arbitration that
the charge of judicial intolerance has been carried too far and that
it no longer has justification today. It is apparent also, with respect
to arbitration, that the judicial role is a limited one, though never so
narrow as to negate justice, nor quite so narrow as to require enlarge-
ment.
Judges may at times have erred in not making sufficient allowance
for differences in the arbitral process; thus, perhaps, some chiding
has been necessary as a reminder of its independent nature. In reply,
however, it can be said that arbitrators have made inroads on the
prerogatives of judges and this could not be accepted lightly. Those
who find no element of judicial jealousy in the control exercised
by the courts 77 overlook the fact that judges, too, are human. Hon-
orable as is the role of arbitrator, like that of judge, he is not to be
allowed to become what Professor Herzog has called him-a "judicial
demi-god"'"7 -and if completely unrestrained, that title might be-
come appropriate. The very fact that his actions will not go un-
questioned leads to greater caution and precision in his making an
award. There is no value in protecting a poor award or an erroneous
one any more than there is in protecting a wrong decision. Neither
has attributes of sanctity. Sharp judicial scrutiny of both makes for
better judgments.'79
Though what is now to be offered cannot serve as justification for
176 It can be noted that there exists a direct relationship between the incidence of
court review and the frequency of the use of arbitration. One in a sense mirrors the
other. With the increase in resort to arbitrations of all kinds there has been an attendant
rise in the number of cases coming before the courts.
177 Professor Herzog minimizes it in his article, supra note 41.
178 "They displayed the attitude of judicial demi-gods, who stood above the law
of the community, were not bound by it, and, therefore could create and invoke their
own law and determine each case before them according to their own concepts of
justice and economic philosophy." Id. at 25.
179 It has been suggested that a greater deterrent to indifferent arbitral awards than
fear of court review is the factor of acceptability-the tendency of the parties them-
selves to dishonor an unacceptable award. Arbitrators wish to be called upon again
and are desirous of having their actions approved. Simkin, "Acceptability as a
Factor in Arbitration," Labor Relations Series (1952). The writer suggests that both
of these checks, judicial review and party acceptability, have a salutary effect.
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judicial intervention, at least it can be recognized as one factor in
amelioration of the too harsh criticism that has been directed against
our judiciary. The courts are faced with a paradox in assessing the
role of the arbitrator. Two contradictory attributes of the arbitrator's
position and function confuse the judges. At one and the same time
he is recognized as an expert and as a mere neophyte. His expertise
stems from his special knowledge in his chosen field. The arbitrator
may be an authority on international trade, a person informed con-
cerning the vagaries of building construction, or a merchant in the
textile business. There the courts accord him his due.180 But in the
area of his ignorance-the law-the judges unrealistically have sought
to hold him to a proper application of legal principles, many of which
he knows not. Yet it is submitted that a just result can be achieved
by the arbitrator without the observance of legal intricacies and, as
the orbit of judicial control has become smaller, this has been recog-
nized. Our law rests on basic tenets of right and wrong controlling
the actions of all mankind; these principles carry over into the market
place and are applied by an arbitrator as they are by a judge, only in
a different manner.
180 Note this recent judicial language recognizing the expertise of an arbitrator
in a controversy concerning the sale of a vessel claimed by the buyer to be defective:
[T]he last sentence in the arbitration clause is interesting. It reads: 'The ar-
bitrators shall be commercial men conversant with shipping matters.' This may
not be exactly comforting to the vanity of courts, but it does indicate that the
parties decided, rightly or wrongly, that the justice they desired was that of their
peers in the shipping business. This they have a right to do under our arbitra-
tion statutes. This is a right exercised even in ancient times. . . . This right the
court may not deny them.
Matter of Transpacific Transport Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 316, 322-23, 193 N.Y.S.2d 277,
285 (1st Dep't 1959).
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